LexSTATE OF KARNATAKA versus VEDANAYAGAM
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STA TE OF KARNATAKA A v. VEDANAYAGAM NOVEMBER 23 994 [M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. JA YACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.] B Indian Penal Code 1860-Clause Thirdly a/Section 300 Scope-Single injury-Stabbing with dagger on left side of chest Injury found sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death-No pre meditation-Accused intended to cause that particular injury-Whether Clause Thirdly of Section 300 /PC attracted-Held-Yes Conviction u!s 302 sustainable. C This appeal has been filed against the judgement of the High Court holding that the offence would come down to Section 304 P1trt II IPC and not one u/s 302 IPC. The deceased, who was son of P.W. l's sister, was living with his D mother PW 3. The accused developed illicit intimacy with the wife of PW 1. On the fateful day PW 3, the mother of the deceased and the mother of the accused were quarrelling with each other. The accused hearing the quarrel came out of his house armed with a dagger. Seeing this PW 1 went and brought the deceased. Then the accused shouted that "you have defamed me. I would not leave you. I will Kill." Saying E this he stabbed on the left side of the chest of the deceased and the deceased fell down •nd died instantaneously. The Trial Court held him guitly u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to under go imprisonment for life. On appeal, the High Court confirmed the finding of the Trial Court namely that it was the accused who caused the fatal injury but F held that having regard to the genesis of the matter i.e. that there was no pre-meditation and since the accused inflicted only one blow with the dagger which unfortunately landed on the chest, it cannot be said that the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased. (The High Court also observed that on seeing the deceased the accused who had. G only a knife in his hand gave only one blow and unfortunately it landed on the chest of the deceased and that there are no circumstances placed before us to indicate that the accused wanted to finish off Sugumaran or intendt.d to finish off Sugumaran. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is very difficult to infer that the accused inflicted the blow on the chest of the deceased with an intention to bring about his H 697 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R A death. The High Court further held that "Therefore, according to the principle laid down in Tholan's case, we think that the offence, however, unfortunate it may be, would come down to Section 304 Part II, IPC.") The question that arose for consideration was whether the offence B committed by the sole accused in this case amounted to murder punishable u/s 302 IPC or culpable homicide punishable u/s 304 Part II IPC and whether the High Court was right in holding that whenever there is only single injury the offence would be culpable homicide though the medical evidence is to the effect that the some is necessarily fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. c D E F G Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD 1.1 Both the Courts below have clearly noted that the injury was a very serious one which brought about the instant death. The blow was aimed at the chest and the injury was inflicted with great force with a deadly weapon on the vital part. It entered the thoracic cavity, passed through the substance of the sternum, injured the lower lobe of the left lung and entered the chamber of the right ventricle. It is not a case where there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased or where they grappled with each other so that it cannot be definitely said that the accused aimed the blow at a particular part of the body and therefore, intended to cause that particular injury which was objectively found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No doubt there was no pre-meditation. Therefore, the important question is whether Clause Tqirdly of Section 300 IPC is attracted. (701 D to F) 1.2 Ingredient of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC is not the intention to cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be proved is the intention to cause the particular injury that was present. It is fallacious to contend that whenever there is a single injury only a case of culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other circumstances. (702 G) Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 1495; Jagrup Singh v. State of Harayana, [1981) 3 SCC 616, Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Adm
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