STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. versus S.M. KOTRAYYA AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 426 · Decided: 02-09-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 
v. 
S.M. KOTRA YYA AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 2, 1996 
B 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. 
S.21-Delay in approaching the Tribunal-Explanation therefor that 
C relief granted in similar cases came to notice late-Tribunal condoning the 
delay-On appeal held, it is not necessary that explanation should be given 
for the delay which occasioned for the peliod melltioned in sub-sections ( 1) 
or (2) of S.21-But explanation should be given for the delay which oc-
caSioned after the expiry of the peliod-T1ibunal to satisfy itself whether the 
explanation offered was proper explanation-Coming to know of relief granted 
D in similar cases is no proper explanation-Hence T1ibunal wholly unjustified 
. in condoning the delay. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 12037-48 
of 1996. 
E 
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.89 of the Karnataka Ad-
F 
G 
H 
ministrative Tribunal at Bangalore in A. Nos. 4134-45 of 1989. 
M. Veerappa for the Appellants. 
D.V. Sehgal (A.C.) for the Respondents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Delay condoned. 
Leave granted. 
At the outset, we express our deep appreciation for the valuable 
assistance rendered by Shri D.V. Sehgal, learned senior counsel who 
appeared as amicus culiae at our request since the respondents did not 
appear either in person or through counsel. 
These appeals by special leave arise from the common order of the 
426 
STA TE v. S.M. KOTRA YY A 
427 
Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, dated August 14, 1989 made in Ap-
A 
plication Nos. 4134-45/89. The admitted facts are that the respondents, 
while working as teachers in the Department of Education, availed of 
Leave Travel Concession during the year 1981-82. But later it transpired 
that they had never utilised the benefit of LTC but drew the amount and 
used in. Consequently, recovery came to be made in the year 1984-86. Some B 
of the persons filed applications in the Tribunal questioning the power of 
o 
the Government to recover the same. It would appear that thereafter in 
August 1989 the Tribunal allowed similar claims and had held that the 
appellant-Government could not recover the same from the respondents. 
On coming to know of it, the respondents filed application in August 1989 C 
before the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal 
has condoned the delay by the impugned order. Thus these appeals by 
special leave. 
Shri Veerappa, learned counsel for the appellant, placing reliance on 
the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in S.S. Rathore v. State D 
of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 at 591, para 21, contended that the 
Tribunal has no power to condone the delay if the respondents had not 
given any explanation why they could not file the application within six 
months and if they came to be filed beyond _six months covered by sub-sec-
tion (2) of section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, E 
the "Act"), the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay. We find no 
force in the contention. 
Section 21 reads .as under : 
"21. LIMITATION - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an applica-
tion, -
(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause 
F 
(a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 h~s been made in connection 
with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year G 
from the date on which such final order has been made; 
-
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is men-
tioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made 
and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such H 
0 
428 
A 
B 
c 
D 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. 
final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry 
of the said period of six months. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), 
where -
(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had 
arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period 
of three years immediately preceding the date on which the juris-
diction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable 
under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates, 
and 
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been 
commenced before the said date before any High Court, the 
application shall be e11tertained by the Tribunal if it is made withi11 
the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may b

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