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STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS versus THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 346 · Decided: 26-11-1959 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

1959 
November z6. 
346 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)] 
STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS 
v. 
THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER 
(B. P. SINHA, C.J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, 
K. SuBBA RAo, K. C. DAs GuPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) 
Supreme Court, Appellate Jurisdiction of-Special leave to 
appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the 
interpretation of the Constitution-M eam:ng of-Constitution of 
India, Art. I32(2). 
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu 
& Kashmir cha)lenging the vires of r. 4-47 of the Jammu and 
Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the 
said rule was Hltra vires as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. 
The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certific-
ate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution which was rejected on 
the ground that no substantial question of law as to. the inter-
pretation of the Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter 
the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under 
Art. 132(2) of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty 
to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability of the 
appeal. There was no controversy between the parties in regard 
to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, and the 
dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule 
stood the test of reasonable classification. The respondents raised 
a preliminary objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of 
the Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was 
satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law as 
to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that since, in the 
present case, the interpretation of Art. I4 of the Constitution was 
not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court and 
no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, could 
arise for consideration, no special leave could be granted under 
the said Article. 
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever 
a question of classification was raised that by itself involved the 
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as the 
impugned classification was concerned, 
Held, that the principle underlying Art. 132(2} of the Consti-
tution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution 
must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object that Article 
is freed from other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 
and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed 
irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving 
only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
The interpretation of a provision means the method by which 
the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. Where 
I 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
347 
rg.sg 
the parties agree as to t~e true interpretation or a provision or 
do not raise any question in respect thereof, the case does not 
involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the 
Stale of 
. 
Constitution. A substantial question of law cannot arise where Jammu 6- Kaslmm 
that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this 
v. 
Court. 
TltaAu, Ganga 
In the instant case, the question raised does not involve any 
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. 
T. IM. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor Gc?teral in Cosmcil 
(1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) I, Blmdan Clzotedhry v. The State of Biharβ€’ 
[1955) I S.C.R. 1045. Chiranjit Lal Cltowdhuri v. U11io" of b1dia, 
Lrgsol S.C.R. 869, Ram Kr~shna Dalmia v. Jt~slice. Tendolkar, 
[1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad Haneef Quareshs v. State of 
Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629, relied on. 
CIVJL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
217 of 1959. 
β€’ 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and 
order dated June 20~ 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir 
High Court, in Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958. 
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, 
N. S .. Bindra, R. H. Dhehar and T. 1J1. Sen, for the 
appellants. 
R. K. Garg and M. K . Ramamurthy, 8. N. Andley, 
J. B. Dadachanji, Rame.shwar Nath and P. L. Volwa, 
for the respondents. 
1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court 
was delivered by 
Singh 
I 
SunBA RAo J.-This appeal byΒ· special leave raises 
subba nao J. 
the question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of tho Consti- β€’ 
tution. 
The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the 
second respondent, M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics 
And Transport Workers Co-operative S

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