LexSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR versus BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
' . :1 ~ ·~ .l B c D E STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR v BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD May 6, 1966 [A. K. SARKAR, C.J., J. R. MUDHOLKAR, R. S. BACHAWAT, J. M. SHELAT AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.] Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, s. 37-Jammu and Kash- mir Commission of Inquiry Act 1962, ss. 3, 4(c) and 10-Acts of a Minister while in office, whether can be subject of inquiry under Inquiry Act-S. 37 of Constitution whether a bar to such inquiry- Matters of public importance' and 'definite' in s. 3, meaning of-Affi- davits fil.ed before Commission of Inquiry-Right to cross examine deponents, extent of. The first respondent became a member of the Council of Minis- ter' of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and was the Prime Minister of the State from 1953 to January 1963, when he resigned: Thereafter a Notification was issued by the State Government under s. 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Inquiry Act 1962 setting up a Commission to inquire into the wealth, acquired by the first res- pondent and certain specjfied members of his family during his period of office; the c·ommission: was also to inquire whether in acquiring this wealth there was any abuse of his official position by the first respondent or the said relatives. The Commiss;on so appointed held certain sittings between February 1965 and August 1965 in which the first respondent took part. In September 1965 he filed a writ petition before the High Court of J ammu and Kashmir and the High Court, al'Iowing the sa!d petition, set aside the Notification institut- ing the inquiry and quashed the proceedings of the Commission. The State appealed to the Court. HELD: (i) Section 37 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir talks of the collec1Jcve responsibility of Ministers to the Legislative Assembly. That' only means that the Council of Ministers will have to stand or fall together, every member being responsible for the action of any other. The section does not mean that a Minister is p responsible for his acts only to the Legislature and no action can be taken against. him except for criminal or tortious acts, in th€ ordi- nary course of law, unless the Legislature by a resolution deman- ded it. No British convention to this effect, if any, can be said to have been adopted bv s. 37. Furthermore, the responsibility to the Legislature is of the Counoil of Ministers, and not of these who have, like the first respondent ceased to be Ministers. [405C,E]. (ii) Section 3 Of the Commission of foquiry Act expressly &ives G ··power to Government as well as to both the Houses of Legislature to initiate .. action instituting an inquiry. When: enacting it the Legis- lature obviously did not consider that there was any conveption, or anything in s. 37 which prevented a Commission of Inquiry being set up under the Act at the instance of the Government or the Legis- lative Council. [405F-G] B (iii) The acts of a Minister while in office do not cease to be matters of public :mportance after he ceases to hold office; their character cannot change. When. it is alleged that a Minister h8' ac- quired vast wealth for himself and his friends by abuse of his offi- · . ,,c\aJ'. position, there can .be po question that.the matter is of .public • •. ! ': ,,_ 402 SUPRE:.IE COURT REPORTS [1966] SUPP, S.C.R. importance. h does not cease to be of. public importance merely A because what 1s pro)l05ed JS to mqmre mto allegations and not into the steps to be taken. to prevent lapses in the future. Nor can ab- sence of pub!1c ag1tat1on show that the facts to be inquired into are not of public importance. [40iE-G; 408-G] Ram Krishan Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendo!kar, [1959] S.C.R. 279, referred to. (.iv) It is incorrect to say that• allegations mentioned are not definite or that an inquiry into them is not contemplated by the Inquiry Act. [ 409E-F] (v) It cannot be inferred from the provisions of s. 10 of the Act that a Commission of Inquiry can inquire into the conduct of a per- son only mr1dcntally, when the mam inquiry is in respect of something else. What can be done indirectly should obviously have been considered capube of bting done directly. [411B] (vi) On the facts o.f the case the inquiry could not be said to be mala fide. [ 412F] (v1i) The doctrine of Cabinet responsibility does not mean that if an inquiry was made against one of the members of the Cabinet that would be discrimination under Art. 14. The respon
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.