LexSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH versus TARA DUTT AND ANR.
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A ST A TE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. TARA DUTT AND ANR. NOVEMBER 19, 1999 B [G.B. PATTANAIK, M. SRINIVASAN AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860/Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947/Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 109, 417, 465, 468, 420 and 120-B!Section 5 (2)/Sections 468 and 473-Respondents charged for the offences under C Sections 468, 420 and 120-B-Cognizance taken four years after the commission-Trial Court acquitted respondents of the said charges but convicted them under Sections 417, 465 and 109-0n appeal the High Court acquitted the respondents of the charges under Sections 417, 465 and 109 also on the ground of cognizance being barred by limitation-On appeal- D Held, /imitation for offences is for the offences charged and not the offences proved-No period of limitation is provided for the offences under Sections 468, 420 and 120-B-Cognizance by the trial Court not barred by limitation-Power to condone delay must be exercised by a speaking order- Section 473 not applicable to the present case as no period of /imitation is provided for the offences charged. E Respondents were challaned for offences under Sections 468, 420, 120- B of the Penal Code and Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Cor.ruption Act, 1947. The offence was alleged to have been committed in the year 1983 by forging the receipts under the 'Scab Control Scheme, 1983'. The chargesheet was submitted in November, 1987 and cognizance was taken in December, F 1987. The Special Judge acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid charges but convicted them under Section 417 and 465 read with Section 109 IPC. In appeal, the High Court acquitted the respondents of charges under Sections 417 and 465 IPC on the ground that cognizance was barred by limitation. The High Court observed that the power to condone delay was not exercised G by the Special Judge and cognizance by the trial Court was barred by limitation. In appeal to this Court, a two judge Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench; thus the matter came up before the present Bench of three Judges. Allowing the appeal, the Court H 514 STA TE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. TARA DUTT 515 HELD : 1.1. The plain and unambiguous language of Section 468 of the A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 makes it crystal clear that under sub- section 2 (a) where the offence for which the accused is charged is punishable with fine only, the prosecution must he launched within_six months from the date of commission of the offence. Similarly, under sub-section (2) (b), the period of limitation is one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment B for a term not exceeding onte year and under sub-section (2) (c) of the said Section where the offence charged is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, then the period of limitation provided is three years for taking cognizance. Sub-section (3) of Section 468 which was added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1978 provides that in relation to offences which may be tried together, the period of c limitation shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more or most severe punishment. The language of sub- section (3) makes it imperative that the limitation provided in Section 468 for taking cognizance is in respect of the offence charged and not in respect of offence finally proved. [518-D-E-F[ 1.2. In the case in hand, the respondents were charged under Section 468 read with Section 120-B IPC, for which the imposable punishment is seven years and Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years D and for such offences no period of limitation having been provided for in Section E 468, the cognizance taken by the Special Judge cannot be said to be barred by limitation. [518-G-H) State of Punjab v. Swaran Singh, [1981) 3 SCC 34, distinguished . . 2.1 Section 473 Cr.P.C. confers power on the Court taking cognizance F after the expiry of the period of limitation, if is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay had been properly explained and it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. Therefore, in respect of the offences for which a period of limitation has been provided in Section 468, power had been conferred on the Court taking cognizance to extend the said G period oflimitation wher
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