STATE OF GUJARAT versus ARCELOR MITTAL NIPPON STEEL INDIA LIMITED
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B C D E F G H 720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R. [2022] 12 S.C.R. 720 720 STATE OF GUJARAT v. ARCELOR MITTAL NIPPON STEEL INDIA LIMITED (Civil Appeal Nos. 7710-7714 of 2021) JANUARY 21, 2022 [M. R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.] Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969: s. 49(2), 45 β Exemption from payment of sales tax β ESL-assessee dealer, a steel manufacturing unit made investments in the Scheme β ESL granted exemption from payment of purchase tax on raw materials for Naphtha and Natural Gas as per Entry No. 255 of the Notification dated 05.03.1992, subject to fulfilling certain conditions β Amendment to Entry No. 255 vide two notifications β Under the said three Notifications, main requirements was that the eligible unit furnishes to the selling dealer a certificate in Form No. 26 declaring that the goods shall be used by it as raw materials, processing materials or consumable stores in its industrial unit for which it has obtained the eligibility certificate, for the manufacture of goods in its industrial unit as per the conditions provided under the three notifications β Said exemption made available to steel manufacturing units and the units/entities engaged in generating electricity placed in the list of industries βNot Eligibleβ for this incentive β Natural Gas and Naphtha purchased by the ESL, against declarations in Form No.26 were sold to EPL and EPL utilized the Natural Gas and Naphtha purchased from ESL for the purpose of generating/manufacturing electricity, which came to be sold to the ESL by the EPL β Assessee dealer seeking exemption from payment of the purchase tax as per the original Entry No.255(2) vide notification dated 05.03.1992 β Entitlement to β Held: As per the declaration furnished in Form No.26, the eligible unit-ESL was required to actually use the goods by him within the State of Gujarat as raw materials, for manufacture of goods by him β Power producing companies were specifically put in the list of βineligibleβ industries for any exemption from sale/ purchase tax on procurement of raw materials β Transfer of Naphtha and Natural Gas by the eligible unit ESL to EPL, after availing the exemption from payment of purchase tax and not using the raw A B C D E F G H 721 material for its own use is in violation of the eligibility criteria/ condition mentioned in the Original Entry No. 255(2) β Basic eligibility condition that the eligible unit βshall actually use the goodsβ remain the same in amended Entry No.255(2) vide notifications dated 14.11.2002 and 16.01.2002 β Subsequent amended Entry can be said to be clarificatory and expanding the scope of eligibility as it was β It cannot said to be taking away the rights available to the eligible unit under the original Entry No.255(2) dated 05.03.1992, or in anyway in conflict with the first/ parent notification/Entry No.255(2) β Thus, there was breach of the declaration given in Form No.26 (Entry No.255) by the assessee dealer β Demand of the purchase tax on and after 14.11.2000, not hit by the principle of promissory estoppel β ESL not entitled to the exemption from payment of the purchase tax as per the original exemption notice β It was a case of false and wrong claim of exemption, thus, levy of penalty justified β Assessee dealer, liable to pay the penalty not exceeding one and one-half times. Interpretation of statutes: Exemption notifications under taxing statutes β Construction /Interpretation of β Held: Exemption notification should be strictly construed and given meaning according to legislative intendment β It is not open to the court to ignore the conditions prescribed in industrial policy and the exemption notifications β If any of the conditions laid down in the notification is not fulfilled, the party is not entitled to the benefit of that notification β Gujarat Sale Tax Act, 1969 Doctrines: Doctrine of promissory estoppel β Applicability of, in taxing statutes β Held: Doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy and has to be moulded depending on the facts of each case and not straitjacketed into pigeonholes β There cannot be any hard and fast rule for applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel but the doctrine has to evolve and expand itself so as to do justice between the parties and ensure equity between the parties β In taxing matters, the doctrine of promissory estoppel as such is not applicable and the Revenue can take a position different from its earlier stand in a case with established distinguishing features
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex