STATE OF BIHAR versus BAIDNATH PRASAD@ BAIDYANATH SHAH AND ANR.
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ST ATE OF BIHAR v. BAIDNATH PRASAD@ BAIDYANATH SHAH AND ANR. OCTOBER 19, 2001 [K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. V ARIAV A, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Section 482-Quashing of criminal proceedings-Prayer for discharge in a long pending criminal matter before Judicial Magistrate-Rejected- Accused moved the High Court-High Court observed that the case is pending for several years-Nothing on record to show that delay in proceeding caused due to !aches on the part of the accused-Hence quashed the criminal proceed- ings-On appeal, held, the seriousness qf the qffence involved is not to be over- looked while considering the question whether delay alone is sufficient to quash criminal proceeding-High Court order set aside. Section 245-Applicability of-An order o.f discharge can be passed when Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made-out which if unrebutted, warrant conviction-Or when he considers the charges to be groundless-Accused cannot seek advantage qf the delay (f their contribu- tion towards the delay was substantial. An F.I.R. was registered under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. After completion of the inquiry, a com- plaint was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate on 13.1.92. The Magis- trate took cognizance of the offence and instituted proceedings against accused persons including respondents. First respondent thereafter moved the Sessions Court in revision. The Sessions Judge quashed the Criminal proceeding on 29.5.92. Appellant moved the High Court on 1.4.94. The High Court overturned the order of the Sessions Court. Thereafter on account of the absence of accused the case remained in limbo till 14.10.96, when all the accused made their appearance before the Magistrate. The Trial Magistrate collected evidence and the case was posted for framing charge. On 5.1.1998, the accused filed a petition for discharging them, which was dismissed by the trial Court. Against the said order, respondent moved the High Court. The High Court quashed the criminal proceeding holding that the case was pending for more than 7 years and there was 461 A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. nothing on record to show that the delay in proceeding with the case has been caused due to laches on the part of petitioners and therefore the proceeding. against petitioners should not continue any further. In this appeal, the appellant-State challenged the Judgment of the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The interval between 13.1.1992 (the date on which the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence) and 24.7.1998 (the date on which the High Court quashed the proceedings) is too long a period. If the criminal case remained without any progress during the said period it portrays a sad picture of the administration of criminal justice. But the uncontroverted fact/situation in this case reflects t~at the respondents- accused have no justification in seeking advantage of delay because their contribution towards such delay was, by no means insubstantiaf. The ideal situation is to have criminal proceedings completed swiftly. But the ideal is far from practical attainment due to variety of reasons. If one has to abide by the ideal alone, then any p~riod of delay is enough to axe-down the criminal proceedings. In considering the question whether delay alone is sufficient to quash pending criminal proceedings, the seriousness of the offence involved is not to be overlooked. (463-H; 464-A-B; 465-B; E-F] Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2001] 4 SCC 525, relied on. Rajiv Gupta v. State of H.P., [2000] 1 SCC 68, held inapplicable. 2. An order of discharge of the accused after collecting the evidence envisaged in Section 244 Cr.P.C., can be passed only when the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has . been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction. This is the legislative edict of Section 245 Cr.P.C. The only other exception to the said percept is that is it open to the Magistrate to discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case if for reasons to be recorded, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless. [ 464-G-H] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1075 of 2001. From the Judgment and Order dated 24.7.98 of the Patna High Court in H Cr!.
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