STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH versus RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA & ANOTHER

Citation: [1977] 1 S.C.R. 601 · Decided: 15-09-1976 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. SARKARIA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 14 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

~· 
• 
601 
ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH 
v. 
RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA & ANOTHER 
September 15. 1976 
[R. S. SARKARIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, .IJ.J 
Penal Code--Ss. 299 an4 300-Cu/pable homicide not amo1111ti11g to murder 
and Murder-Disti11ctio11-Tests to be applied in each case-s. 300, 
Thirdly 
i.P.C.-Scope of 
Jn the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' 
1'.ts specie. 
All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. 
Speakinr 
.ienerally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable 
A 
B 
.homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, pro-
C 
portionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises 
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable 
·homicide of the first degree. 
This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, 
·which is defined in s_. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable 
.homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the Ist part of s. 304. 
Then there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type 
.of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest 
_among the punishments provided for the three grades. 
Culpable homicide of 
•his degree is punishable under the second Part of s. 304. 
[606B-D] 
D 
Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with ell. (2) and (3) of s. 
300. The 
distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the know-
ledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a 
peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is 
)ikely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not m the 
ordinary way of p.ature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health 
-0r condition. 
The 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of 
E 
~lause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the 
.offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the 
particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause 
This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s. 300. 
[607C-DJ 
Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s. 300 can be where the· 
assailant causes death by a first blow intentionally given 
knowing that the 
victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart 
and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person oo a result 
<1f the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case 
may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special 
frnilty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury suffi-
cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be 
murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. 
Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the 
offender. 
(607£-F] 
In Clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occur-
ring tn the corresponding clause (b) of 
s. 
299, 
the 
words 
"sufficient 
ia the ordinary course 
of 
nature" 
have 
been 
used. 
The 
distinction 
between a 
bodily 
injury likely to cause death and 
a bodily 
injury 
.sufficient in the. ordinary course 
of 
nature 
to 
cause 
death, 
is 
fine 
but real, &nd, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. 
The diffe-
rence is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intend-
ed bodily injury. 
The word "likely" in s. 299(b) conveys 
the 
sense 
of 
of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words bodily injury 
...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean 
th:it 
dcatb will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the 
prdinary course of nature. [607G-HJ 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
602 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1977) 1 S.C.R. 
. 
For cases to fall within clause (3 ), it is not necessary that the offender" 
!n!ended t? .ca~se deat~, so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily 
m1ury or m1unes sufficient 
to 
cause 
death 
in the 
ordinary course of 
nature. 
[608B] 
Clause (c) of s. 299 and clause (4) of s. 300 both require knowledge of 
the probability of the act causing death. 
Clause ( 4) of s. 300 would be 
applica·ble where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of dea

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