LexSTATE OF A.P. versus GUVVA SATYANARAYANA
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[2008] 13 S. C.R. 960 A STATE OF A.P. \I. GUVVA SATYANARAYANA (Criminal Appeal No.1453 of 2003) B SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.] Evidence Act, 1872: s. 32 - Dying declaration - High c Court discarding dying declaration on the ground that same was not free from suspicion - Correctness of - Held: On facts, correct - Statement of mother of deceased that deceased re- gained consciousness the next day is contrary to the evidence on record -· Doctor who examined deceased when she was D brought to hospital after sustaining burn injuries stated that deceased had stated to him that she sustained injuries acci- dentally at her residence - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302. Prosecution case was that deceased was harassed by her husband, the accused for bringing dowry. On the E day of incident at about 8.30 p.m., accused quarrelled with deceased, doused her with kerosene and set her on fire. At 9.15 p.m., uncle of deceased lodged FIR. Magistrate recorded Dying Declaration of deceased on the same night in the presence of doctor. She succumbed to inju- F ries after few days. The Trial Court relied on the dying declaration and recorded conviction under s.498A and s.302 IPC. On ap- peal, High Court found that the charge in respect of s.302 IPC rested on dying declaration purportedly made by the G deceased at5.40 a.m. on 12.4.1994 and the offence had taken place on 11.4.1994 at 9 p.m. High Court held that the offence under s.302 IPC was not established and the dying declaration was not free from suspicion. However, the charge relatable to s.498A was held to be proved, and H 960 - STATE OF A.P. v. GLJWA SATYANARAYANA 961 sentence of two years RI enhanced to three years RI. A Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The first information report was given on 11.4.1994 at 9.15 p.m. i.e. immediately after the occurrence. B In this report, the informant had stated that the accused demanded dowry from the deceased and was beating her; that on the date of incident he was drunk and demanded additional dowry; that unable to bear the agony, the de- ceased poured kerosene over her and set herself ablaze. c In the first information report, therefore, the allegation was that deceased committed suicide by setting herself on fire after pouring kerosene. When the complainant was ex- amined as PW-1, he accepted the contents of the report and stated that the report was on the basis of the infor- 0 mation heard, given by a boy but no enquiry was made from the deceased. He also could not talk to her. The boy who had given the information was not known to him. He stated that the deceased was unconscious and regained consciousness only the next day around noon. The mother of the deceased accompanied the deceased to E the hospital also claimed that the deceased was uncon- scious and regained consciousness only on the second day. As rightly noted by the High Court, this was contrary to the evidence on record. The Magistrate purportedly recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 5.40 F a.m. on 12.4.1994. That means the deceased was con- scious at 5.40 a.m. and doctor certified that she was con- scious and coherent. [Para 5] (964, F-H; 965,A-C] 1.2. To add to the vulnerability, Ex.P/12 was record G of the case maintained by the hospital. When the doctor examined the deceased she was conscious. The doctor noted that the deceased had stated to have sustained burns around 9 p.m. at her residence. She was given some treatment and referred to the resident medical of- H 962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 13 S.C.R A ficer. The doctor noted that the deceased alleged to have sustained burns accidentally at her residence. It was fur- ther noted that she was conscious and coherent. It is, therefore, established that she was conscious when she was admitted to the hospital at 11.45 p.m. on 11.4.1994. If B the accused had poured kerosene and set her on fire she \. would have stated the same in normal course to the doc- tor. Therefore, the factors highlighted by the High Court appear to be on sound footing. That being so, the order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to c warrant interference. [Paras 6, 7] [965,D-F] CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1452 of 2003 From the final Judgment and Order dated 2/7/2003 of the D High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal
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