LexSTATE (NCT OF DELHI) versus AHMED JAAN
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A B [2008] 12 S.C.R. 28 STATE (NCT OF DELHI) V. AHMED JAAN (Criminal Appeal No. 1262 of 2008) AUGUST 12, 2008 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ] Limitation Act, 1963: C . s. 5 - Condonation of delay - "sufficient cause" - HELD: It is sufficiency of the cause. which counts, and not length of delay - Expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction - As regards delay on the part of State, certain amount of latitude is not .impermissible - Expression "suffi- D cient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's <lelay - Matter remitted to High Court to decide the criminal revision on merits - Sug- gestions made to prevent delay in State litigation - Adminis- E tration of justice - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 401. A charge-sheet was filed against the respondent-ac- cused for commission of offences punishable u/ss 121, 121-A, 1.22, 124-A and 120-8, IPC. The trial court, by its order dated 30.10.1998,. discharged the accused holding F . that prima facie there was no evidence against the ac- cused. The revision petition filed in ~003 by the State + along with an application for condonation of delay was dismissed by the.High Court as time barred. In the instant appeal filed by the State, it was con- G tended for the appellant that the order of the trial court directing discharge of the accused was unsustainable both on facts and in law; and the High Court did not even consider the explanation furnished for the delay.· Allowing the appeal, the Court H 28 STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 29 +- HELD: 1.1 The proof by sufficient cause is a condi- A ....,,, tion precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discre- tion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause; and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. What constitutes suffi- B cient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a lib- eral construction. [para 7-8] [33,G; 34,C,D] N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222; New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra 1975 (2) SCC c 84Q; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969 SC 575; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi 1979 (4) SCC 365; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan 1969 (2) SCC 770; State of Kera/a v. E. K. Kuriyipe 1981 Supp SCC 72; Mi/avi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982 (3) SCC 366; 0. P Kathpalia D v. Lakhmir Singh 1984 (4) SCC 66; Collector Land Acquisi- ~ tion v. Katiji 1987 (2) SCC 107; Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra 1987 Supp SCC 339; and G Ramegowda, Major v. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer 1988 (2) SCC 142 - relied on. Brij lndar Singh v. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 E (PC) - referred to. 1.2 No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Equally, the F ~ State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the deci- sion whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through G its officers or servants. It is axiomatic that decisions are ) taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace en- cumbered with procedural red-tape in decision making process. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not im- permissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost H 30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R. A for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The ex- pression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be consid- ered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explain- s ing every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The co·urt should decide the matters on merits unless the case c is hopelessly without merit. [para 14] [38,E, G-H; 8-0] D State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 1996 (3) SCC 132; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kera/a
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