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STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) versus PREM RAJ

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 235 · Decided: 05-08-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

• 
ST A TE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) 
v. 
PREM RAJ 
AUGUST 5, 2003 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYA T, JJ. ] 
A 
B 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 433 (c)-Power to 
commute-Accused sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine-High Court 
commuting the sentence on deposit of enhanced fine and directing state C 
Government to formalize the order-Sustainability of-Held: Power of 
commutation exclusively vests with appropriate Government-Such power has 
to be exercised reasonably and rationally keeping in view reasons necessitating 
commutation-Hence order of High Court unsustainable-However, right of 
accused to move to the appropriate Government not restricted 
Respondent-accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous 
imprisonment for two years for offence under Section 7 of the Prevention 
of Corruption Act, 1988 with fine of Rs. 500. He was further sentenced· 
under Section 13(2) of the Act to undergo imprisonment for 3Yz years with 
D 
fine of Rs. 1000. Respondent-accused challenged the quantum of sentence 
before High Court. High Court commuted the sentence of imprisonment E 
by enhancing the sentence of fine and on deposit of fine directed the State 
Government to formalize the matter by passing an appropriate order 
under Section 433(c) of the Code. Hence the present appeal. 
Appellant-State contended that the power of commutation is not 
available to a Court and it is the exclusive domain of the executive. 
Respondent-accused contended that on the peculiar facts of the case 
no interference is called for. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD:l. The powers of commutation exclusively vest with the 
appropriate Government. Commutation is in essence the alteration of a 
sentence of one kind into a sentence of less severe kind. Section 433 Cr.P.C. 
provides for a power of the State Government to commute the sentence. 
F 
G 
235 
II 
236 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 
A Clause (c) of Section 433 deals with commutation of a sentence of rigorous 
imprisonment to simple imprisonment for any term to which the person 
might have been sentenced, or to fine. (241-D; 240-D] 
1.2. The powers conferred upon the appropriate Government under 
Section 433 have to be exercised reasonably and rationally keeping in view 
B reasons germane and relevant for the purpose of law, mitigating 
circumstances and/or commiserative facts necessitating the commutation 
and factors like interest of the society and public interest. Thus, the order 
pf High Court is set aside. However, the right of the accused to move the 
appropriate Government for such relief as is available in law is not 
C restricted. It would be at sole discretion of the appropriate Government 
to exercise the power conferred on it in accordance with law. 
[241-C, D; 244-D, E) 
Delhi Administration (Now NCT of Delhi) v. Madan Lal (2002) 6 
Supreme 77 and State of Punjab v. Kesar Singh [1996) 5 SCC 495, referred 
D to. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 948 
of 2003. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.2001 of the Delhi High Court 
E in Cr!. A. No 172 of 1997. 
Arun K. Sinha for the Appellant. 
Ravi Prakash Mehrotra and Garvesh Kabaria ·for the Respondent. 
F 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. 
The only question raised in this appeal is whether the High Court of 
Delhi acted within the framework of law in exercising power available under 
G Section 433 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Code'). 
Factual position giving rise to the appeal is as follows: 
Respondent (also described as 'accused') was prosecuted for alleged 
commission of offence punishable under Section 7, and Section(13)(1)(d) 
H punishable in terms of Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 
STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) v. PREM RAJ [ PASA YAT, J.] 
237 
1988 (for short 'the Act'). The respondent was found guilty by Addition!il A 
Sessions Judge, Delhi and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment 
for two years relating to offence under Section 7 with fine of Rs. 500. He was 
further sentenced under Section 13(2) to undergo imprisonment for 3 and Yi 
years with fine of Rs. l,000. Both the sentences were directed to run 
concurrently. The matter was carried in appeal by the responde6.t-accused 
before the High Court. The order of conviction was not challenged at the B 
time of hearing. What was pressed before the High Court related to the 
quantum of sentence. It was submitted that the 

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