STATE (DELHI ADMN.) versus JAGJIT SINGH

Citation: [1988] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 1093 · Decided: 16-12-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.C. RAY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

l 
STATE (DELHI ADMN.) 
v. 
JAGJIT SINGH 
DECEMBER 16, 1988 
[B.C. RAY AND N.D. OZHA, JJ.] 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Section 306--Person accepting 
tender of pardon-To be examined as witness i~ Court of Magistrate 
taking cognizance of offence as well as trial Court-Person resiling 
from earlier statement-Liability to be examined not absolved. 
Many explosions took place in May 1985 in Delhi and Uttar 
Pradesh killing many persons. Consequently, a number of cases were 
registered. In Delhi, FIR No. 238 of 1985 was registered wherein the 
respondent and another accused turned approvers and were granted 
pardon under section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
Both these approvers however resiled from their statements in the 
Court of the Committing Magistrate. 
Four Criminal cases pending in Mee rut were later transferred by 
the Supreme C9urtto the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 
Delhi, to be tri~d along with the case arising out of FIR No. 238of1985. 
In the supplementary committal proceedings in case FIR No. 238 
of I 985, the respondent objected to his being summoned as an approver 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
on the ground inter alia that he could not be examined as a witness in the 
case because he was figuring as an accused person in the other four 
cases on the same facts and circumstances, which were being jointly 
tried. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the application. 
F 
The High Court allowed the respondent's revision petition and directed 
the State not to examine the respondent as an approver in case F.I.R. 
No. 238 of 1985. 
In the appeal before this Court, it was inter alia contended that 
the prosecution could not examine the respondent as a witness because 
G 
he had cast away the pardon granted to him. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: I. The pardon granted to the respondent was accepted by 
"° · him and he was examined as a prosecution witness in the Court of the 
H 
1093 
1094 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 
A 
Committing Magistrate, though he resiled from his statement there. [I097C] 
B 
c 
i. It is a mandate of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Code to the prosecution to examine the approver to whom pardon had 
been granted as a witness both in the Committing Court as well as}n the 
trial court. fl097E] 
J. Section 306 clearly enjoins that the approver who was granted 
pardon had to comply with the condition of making a full and true 
disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge rela-
tive to the offence and to every other concerned whether as principal or 
abettor, in the commission thereof. It is because of this mandate that 
the State cannot withdraw the pardon from the approver nor the 
approver can cast away the pardon granted to him, till he is examined 
a' a witness by the prosecution both in the Committing Court as well as 
in the trial court. fi097H; !098A-B] 
-1. The respondent who has been granted p·ardon in case F.I.R. 
D 
No. 238 of i 985 has to be examined by the prosecution in the trial court 
no matter that he has resiled from his earlier statement and tried to 
conceal what was within his knowledge with regard to the offence in 
qnestion. !HOOD] 
In re: Arusami Goundan, AIR 1959 Mad. 274 and Emperor v. 
E 
Shandino Bhaniperto, AIR 1940 (Sind) ll4 referred to. 
5. Once an accused is granted pardon under section 306, he ceases 
to be an accused and becomes a witness for the prosecution. So long as 
the prosecution does not certify that he has failed to make a fuU and true 
disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relat-
F 
ing to the offence, he continues to be a witness and the prosecution is 
under obligation to examine him as a witness both in the Committing 
Court as well as in the trial court. fl099H; llOOA-B] 
A.J. Peiris v. State ofMadras, AIR 1954 (SC) 616 referred to. 
G 
6. A witness is legally bound to answer any question which is 
relevant to the matter in issue even if the answer to such question is 
likely to incriminate him directly or indirectly. fllOOG] 
7. The proviso to section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act clearly 
protects a witness from being prosecuted on the basis of the answers 
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given by him in a criminal proceeding which tend to criminate him 
directly or indirectly. [llOIA] . 
... 
., 
• 
STATE v. JAGJIT SINGH [RAY, J.] 
1095 
8. The apprehension of the respondent that his evidence as ap-
prover will be used against him in the other fonr criminal cases where 

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