LexSRI VENKATA SEETARAMANJANEYA RICE AND OIL MILLS AND ORS. versus STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC
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1961 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] SRI VENKATA SEETARAMANJANEYA RICE AND OIL MILLS AND ORS. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ETC. [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND s. M. S!KRI, JJ.J Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act, 1949 (Mad. 29 of 1949), ss. 3(1) (2)- Applicability of the Act to electricity supplied by State-In- tention of Legislature, consideration of-Notified orders <>n- hancing agreed rate by State-Whether valid under s. 3-Regu- Zate, meaning of-Increase of tariff-If reasonable and in in- terest of general public-Whether contravenes Arts. 14 and 19(1)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) and (f). Electricity was supplied to the appellants by the respon- dent-state for manY. years past, and several individual agree- ments were passed between them prescribing the terms and conditions for the supply. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply had to be charged. These agreements did not contain any provision authorising the State to increase the rates during their operation. The respondent-state issued two notified orders enhancing the agreed rates. The orders indicated that the main reason which inspired the increase was that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated several years before, had become completely uneconomic and meant continuously growing loss to the State. A large num- ber of consumers challenged the validity of the two orders in the High Court under Art. 226. The writ petitions were allowed and the respondent was restrained from enforcing the revised rates. These decisions were challenged by the respon- dent by appeals in the High Court, which took a different view and dismissed the writ petitions. On appeals to this Court, it was contended, inter alia that the respondent had no authority to increase the rate, changing this important term of the contract by taking recourse to s. 3(1) of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary) Powers Act. that the power to regulate the supply of essefltial articles had to be applied in regard to transactions between citizens and citizens and could not be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplied; that the power to regu- late conferred on the respondent by s. 3(1) could not include the power to increase the tariff rate, that the notified orders were invalid as they contravened the provisions of Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) and that of Art 14 of the Constitution. Held: (i) The challenge to the validity of the notified orders on the ground that they were outside the purview of s. 3(1) of the Act could not be sustained. The State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provid- ed in express terms or by necessary implication. In applying this rule, the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a parti- cular provision which may be in dispute. Where the quest!ion is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute, but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute, the same rule of construction ' 7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457 may have to be applied. Where the statute may be for the pub- 19~4 lie good and by claiming the benefit. c".nferre~ on it bv i!s . - provisions the State may allege that it is servmg the public /" Venka~ good, it would sti.11 be necessary to ascertain whether t~e. in- Ric~~~d'Q;~3~n;lf: tention of the l"'g1slature was to make the relevant proV1s1ons and Otkera applicable. v. Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation of Slale of Andhro Calcutta, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 158 ahd Province of Bombay v. Muni- Praluh etc. cipa! Corporation of the City of Bombay, [1945-46] L.R. 73 I.A. 271, applied. (ii) In construing s. 3 of the Act of the usual rule of con- struction must be adopted. s. 3 must not be read in isolation, but must be considered in its proper setting and due regard must be had for the other provisions of the Act and its gene- ral sch..,me and purpose. (iii) The purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices, it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply; what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price. (iv) ft is well-settled that the function of a clause like cl. (2) of s. 3 is merely illus
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