SRI SWAMI KRISHNANAND GOVINDANAND versus M/S. M.D. OSWAL HOSIERY (REGD.)

Citation: [2002] 2 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 20-02-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.S.M. QUADRI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

SRI SW AMI KRISHNANAND GOVINDANAND 
v. 
MIS. M.D. OSWAL HOSIERY (REGD.) 
FEBRUARY 20, 2002 
[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND 
DORAISWAMY RAW, JJ.J 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 
A 
B 
S.22(d)-land/ord claiming itself to be a public institution-Seeking C 
eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement-<::laim that institute 
needed premises for furtherance of its activities-Tenant denying in written 
statement the status of landlord as a public institution as also that it needed 
pre'fises bona fide for furtherance of its activities-But Advocate appearing 
for ~nant conceded before Additional Rent Controller, both the facts disputed D 
by tenant in his written statement-Additional Rent Controller recorded the 
statement of the Advocate and allowed eviction petition-Rejecting the 
contention of landlord that statement made by counsel for tenant across the 
llar is an admission and the Rent Controller recorded his satisfaction on the 
hasis thereof, the Court-Held, whether the appellant is an institution within 
the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bonafide the E 
premises for fartherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction 
of the Additional Rent Controller-He can record his satisfaction only when 
he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant-For so holding there 
must be material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction 
not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated F 
and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction--
There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material-But 
on the facts of this case, the statement of the counsel of the tenant can not be 
accepted as an admission so as to bind the tenant-Excluding that statement 
from consideration there was no material before the Additional Rent Controller 
to record his satisfaction within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 22 of the G 
Act--Order of eviction was thus without jurisdiction-The statement of counsel 
for tenant can also not be treated as a compromise-Compromise like a contract 
postulates consensus between two parties-A statement of a counsel conceding 
the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate the 
premises, can not be termed a compromise-Evidence Act, 1972-S. 18- H 
2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 
A Compromise. 
Evidence Act, 1972 
S. 18-Admission by party's counsel-Counsel for the tenant conceding 
before the Court duri~g arguments the facts denied by tenant in written 
B statement-Held, in the facts of the case, statement of the counsel of tenant 
cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the tenant. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5062 of 
1997. 
C. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.81 of the Delhi High Court 
D 
E 
in S.A. No. 275 of 1980; 
Jaspal Singh and Shiv Prakash Pandey for the Appellant. 
Rishi for the Respondent. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of 
Delhi allowing the respondent's Second Appeal Order No. 275 of 1980 on 
December 2, 1981. 
The appellant-landlord of the sui~ premises is a registered sociecy under 
the Societies Registration Act. It filed application against the respondent-
tenant for his eviction from the suit premises under Clause ( d) of Section 22 
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short "the Act") on the ground that 
the premises are required bonafide for furtherance of its activities. The 
F respondent filed written statement -denying both that the appellant is an 
institution within the meaning of that provision and that it required the premises 
bonafide for furtherance of its activities. It appears that when the case was 
posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded 
the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the Court. 
G That statement of the advocate was recorded by the Addi. Rent Controller 
thus : "The respondent's learned counsel has admitted the ground of eviction 
and also the fact that appellant is a public charitable institution and for that 
purpose it required the premises". On that basis the eviction application filed 
by the appellant was allowed on 24th March, 1973. Within a week thereafter 
the respondent filed a review petition which was dismissed. He then filed a 
H writ petition challenging the valid icy of the said order

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