SRI INDER SAIN BEDI (DEAD) BY LRS. versus M/S. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS
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A SRI INDER SA.IN BED! (DEAD) BY LRS. V. MIS. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS AUGUST 27, 2004 B [ASHOK BHAN AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] Rent Control and Eviction: Tenancy-Extent of-Determination-Lessor leased a portion of suit C property to a tenant-Licence deed specifically mentioned extent of accommodation so leased-But another portion of the suit property, although mentioned in the licence deed, was scored off and initialed by both parties-Lessor filed suit for ejecti'on of the tenant from the portion leased out to him-Trial court decreed the suit-However, High Court held D that the scored off portion was also part of the tenanted premises and, therefore, suit for possession for only a portion of the property amounted to splitting up of tenancy, which was impermissible in law-Therefore, trial court decree set aside-Correctness of-Held: Even assuming that the scored off portion did exist at the time of commencement of the tenancy, E the High Court erred in holding that the said portion was also leased out but was not shown apprehending trouble from the Municipal Corporation- High Court also erred in building up a new case for the tenant by holding that the entire portion of the suit property was leased out which was against the pleadings of the party-Hence, High Court erred in holding that there was a splitting up of tenancy-High Court's judgment set aside. F Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 106-Lease-Termination of-Notice-Requisite period of- Suit property leased out for manufacturing pwposes-Lessor terminated G lease by giving two months' notice in terms of the lease deed and filed suit for ejection of the lessee-Trial court decreed the suit-But High Court held that six months' notice was required as the property was leased out for manufacturing purposes-Therefore, trial court decree was set aside- Correctness of-Held: In view of the terms of the lease deed it was not H necessary to give six months' notice to terminate the lease even though the 914 • \ ,. - . ' ·~ •, \ 1.S. BEDI v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS 915 property was leased out for manufacturing purposes-Two months• notice A as provided in the lease deed sufficient-Manufacturing lease which was from year to year did not require six months' notice for termination-It would fall in the second half of S. 106 requiring fifteen days' notice of termination. B Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 6 Rule 1 and Order 12 Rule 1-Admission-Pleadings- Averments in-Defendant, in his written statement, accepted as sufficiently correct the plainti.ff s plea regarding the extent of the property leased out- C Effect of-Held: Such acceptance amounted to an admission. The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for seeking a decree for possession by ejectment of the respondent-defendant with respect to a portion of the suit property. It was averred in the plaintiff that the suit property was taken by the respondent as a licensee for a period of D I I months at a certain monthly licence fee and that the respondent continued to remain in possession even after the expiry of the period of licence and that the appellant had accepted the respondent as his tenant. It was· also alleged in the plaint that the respondent had made unauthorized additions/alterations to the suit property. The appellant E had served a notice on the respondent under Section I 06 of the Tral)sfer of Property Act, 1882. The respf!!ldent-defendant, in his written statement, pleaded that the premises described as suit property in the plaint was substantially F correct; that the so-called portion shown in the plaint as unauthorised construction was, in fact, let out to the respondent from the very commencement of the tenancy; that the portion shown in the plaint as unauthorised construction, although scored-off, established that it was in existence at the time of letting out the premises; that the said portion was scored-off since the appellant did not want to mention G the same as he was apprehensive of trouble from the Municipal Corporation. The validity of the notice terminating the tenancy as also the right of the appellant to claim possessitm of the suit property was disputed H 916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A by the respondent on two grounds: (1) that the tenancy between the parties had been created for manufacturing purposes and the same could be terminated in terms of Section 106 of the Act by giving six months' notice which was not d
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