SRI ATHMANATHASWAMI DEVASTHANAM versus K. GOPALASWAMI AIYANGAR
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 763 196J SRI ATHMANATHASWAMI DEVASTHANAM M•y v. K. GOPALASW AMI AIYANGAR (K. S1JBBA RA.o, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and j. R. MUDHOLKAR jj.) Ryoti Lands-Waste land,, brought undtr cultivation-If amount• to cultivable land8-Admi•sion of ryot to po••es•ion of ryoti land8-Permanent right of occupancy-If amounts to lease for a term exceeding 6 years-Sanction of the Endowments Board, if nece'8ary-Miulras Hindu Religious Endawmente Act, I927 (Mad. 2 of 1927), s. 76-Mwlras Estates Land Act, 1908 (Mad. 1of1908), es. 3 (15), 3 (.16), 6, 189. The lands belonging to the appellant temple had been let into possession to the respondent in August, 1944 by the then tru- stee of the temple when the latter was being pressed b) the State authorities for reclaiming the land and putting it to cultivation in connection with the Grow More Food campaign launched by the Government during World War II. The succeeding trustee sued the respondent for the recovery of a sum of money as damages for use and occupation of the land• on the grounds (I) that the lands were uncultivable waste lands and not ryoti lands, (2) that the transaction by which the respondent was let into possession was not binding on the present trustee inasmuch as it had not been entered into after obtaining the permission of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under s. 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927, and (3) that the respondent was, therefore, a tiespasser. The respondent's defence was (1) that the suit lands were ryoti lands and that in view of his being let into possession by the previous trustee he acquired the status of a ryot under s. 3 (15) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and also acquired permanent rights of occupancy under s. 6 of the said Act, (2) that the transaction by which he was let into possession did not amount to an alienation and did not come within the purview of s. 76 of the Endowments Act, and (3) that the suit lands being ryoti and the defendant being a ryot, the suit was not maintainable in the civil court. The trial court decreed the suit but, on appeal, the High Court took the view that the suit could be instituted only in the Revenue Court and l96J Athma.JkaiNmi D1mlMn•m •• IC GoJohs1 .. mi J.i_1111ear 764 SUPRE.MB COURT REPORTS (1964] vor.. that the civil court had lio jurisdiction to entertain it. It accordingly set aside the trial court's decree and ordered the return of the plaint to the plaintiff'·appellant for presentation to the proper court. It further di•missed the cross-objections filed by the appellant with respect to the trial court's allowing credit of certain payments towards rent or damages due from the respondent The evidence disclosed that though the lands• in suit were waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and the like and had not been cultivated for a long time, they were brought under cultivation In connection with the Grow More Food campaign, and there was nothing to show that the reclaimation of 1he land was not profitable financially. It was also found that the respondent was ryot as defined ins. 3 (15) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Bild (I) that the lands in suit were ryoti lands within s. 3 (16) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, as they were cultivable lands. Land which can be brought under cultivation is cultivable land unless some provision of law provides for holding it other- wise in certain circumstances. (2) that the mere fact that s. 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act conferred a permanent right of occupancy on the mere admission of a ryot to the possession of ryoti land by the landholder, did not make the letting of the land to such a person equivalent to the grant of a lease to him for a term exceeding 5 years, and that, therefore, no sanction of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board was necessary for the Jetting of the suit lands to the respondent. (3) ·that the suit for the recovery of damages and eject- ment was not cognizable by a civil court in view of s. 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act, as the respondent was a ryot within the meaning of the Act. ( 4) that the High Court erred in making an order dis- missing the cross-objections filed by the appellant, since, after coming to a conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, it could not decide any question on merits. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 70
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