SREE SWAYAM PRAKASH ASHRAMAM AND ANR. versus G. ANANDAVALLY AMMA AND ORS.

Citation: [2010] 1 S.C.R. 271 · Decided: 05-01-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: TARUN CHATTERJEE · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

[2010) 1 S.C.R. 271 
SREE SWAYAM PRAKASH ASHRAMAM AND ANR. 
A 
v. 
G. ANANDAVALLY AMMA AND ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2010) 
JANUARY 05, 2010 
[TARUN CHATIERJEE AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.] 
Indian Easements Act, 1882- s.13(b)- Easement rights 
8 
- Easement by grant - Suit for declaration of easement rights 
over 'B' schedule property of the plaint as a pathway to 'A' C 
schedule property of the plaint - 'A' Schedule property had 
been allotted to plaintiff in terms of a settlement deed - 'B' 
Schedule pathway was situated within property under control 
and use of defendants - Held: Grant can be by implication 
as well- There was implied grant of 'B' schedule property as 
D 
pathway, which can be inferred for the reason that no other 
pathway was provided to plaintiff for access to 'A' schedule 
property and there was also no objection from defendants to 
use of 'B' schedule property by plaintiff as pathway for number 
of years, at least up to the time, when alone cause of action 
E 
for the suit arose - Plaintiff acquired right of easement in 
respect of 'B' schedule pathway by way of implied grant. 
Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 - Interference with 
findings of facts arrived at by Courts below - Scope - Suit for 
grant of easement rights - No specific isc;ue on question of F 
implied grant - But parties adduced evidence for purpose of 
proving and contesting implied grant - Courts below found 
that plaintiff had acquired right of easement by way of implied 
grant - Held: In such circumstances, Supreme Court cannot 
upset the findings of fact arrived at by Courts below in exercise 
G 
of its powers under Art. 136. 
Respondent-plaintiff file" suit for declaration of 
easement rights by way of necessity or of grant over 'B' 
271 
H 
272 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 1 S.C.R. 
A schedule property of the plaint as a pathway to 'A' 
schedule property of the plaint. 
Both 'A' schedule and 'B' schedule properties of the 
plaint originally belonged to one 'Y', who was in 
8 enjoyment and management of a vast extent of properties 
including plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule properties for benefit 
of the first defendant-Ashramam. After the death of 'Y', 
her disciples executed a settlement deed as per her 
directions whereby 'A' Schedule property of the plaint 
was allotted to the plaintiff. The 'B' Schedule pathway of 
C the plaint was situated within the property under the 
control and the use of defendants. 
The trial court accepted the version of the plaintiff that 
apart from 'B' Schedule pathway, there was no alternate 
D pathway leading to the 'A' schedule property and, that the 
plaintiff was entitled to easement right in respect of the 
'B' schedule pathway by implied grant as also by 
necessity, and decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court 
held that even assuming that the plaintiff had an 
E alternative pathway as contended by the defendants, it 
did not extinguish the right of easement of grant in favour 
of the plaintiff, though the declaration granted on the 
ground of easement of necessity was not justified. Both 
courts concurrently found on appreciation of evidence 
F that 'B' Schedule property was being used by the plaintiff-
respondents for access to 'A' Schedule property even 
after construction of a building on 'A' Schedule property. 
Second appeal filed by defendants was dismissed by the 
High Court. Hence the present appeal. 
G 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. The case of the defendants-appellants that 
since there was no mention in the deed of settlement 
enabling the use of 'B' schedule pathway for access to 
H 'A' schedule property and the building therein, cannot be 
SREE SWAYAM PRAKASH ASHRAMAM v. G. 
273 
ANANDAVALLY AMMA 
the reason to hold that there was no grant as the grant A 
could be by implication as well. The facts and 
circumstances of the case amply show that there was an 
implied grant in favour of the original plaintiff (since 
deceased) relating to 'B' schedule property of the plaint 
for its use as pathway to 'A' schedule property of the a 
plaint in residential occupation of the original plaintiff 
_(since deceased). In absence of any evidence being 
adduced by the appellants to substantiate their 
contention that the original plaintiff (since deceased) had 
an alternative pathway for access to the 'A' schedule C 
property, it is difficult to negative the contention of the 
respondent that since the original plaintiff (since 
deceased) has been continuously using t

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