SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BOMBAY AND OTHERS versus GODREJ AND BOYCE

Citation: [1988] 1 S.C.R. 590 · Decided: 27-10-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: E.S. VENKATARAMIAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BOMBAY, 
AND OTHERS. 
v. 
GODREJ AND BOYCE 
OCTOBER 27, 1987 
B 
[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.] 
__,._ 
Land Acquisition Act-Power of the Government to withdraw 
proceedings for acquisition of lands under section 48 after issue of no ti-
fication under section 4 thereof. 
c 
The State Government, by a notification dated November 6, 1961, 
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issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, notified for acquisi-
tion lands belonging to the respondent. This was followed by a declara-
tion dated November 18, 1965, under section 6 of the Act, and the 
notices calling upon the respondent to put its claims for compensation in 
D respect of the lands sought to be acquired. Thereafter, no further action 
was taken in this behalf. In the meantime, the lands in question were 
encroached upon by a large number of trespassers who put up slums 
thereon. The respondent repeatedly asked the State Government to 
take steps to remove the encroachments and expedite the making of the 
award and payment of the compensation but no action was taken by the 
E 
Government. The respondent thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the 
+ 
High Court for a writ of mandamus, directing the State Government to 
make the award under section 11 of the Act, and take possession of the 
lands after payment of the compensation to the respondent. 
On March 25, 1981, the State Government passed an Order under 
F 
section 48 of the Act, withdrawing the lands of the respondent from 
acquisition, and the respondent was, accordingly, informed of that 
~ 
decision. The respondent thereupon amended its writ petition to 
challenge the withdrawal order above-said as ma/a fide and to pray 
for the quashing of the same. The writ petition was allowed by a Single 
Judge of the High Court and his decision was affirmed by a Division 
G 
Bench of the High Court. Aggrieved, the State Government appealed to 
this Court, against the decision of the High Court. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court, 
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HELD: The High Court erred in striking down the order under 
H section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and compelling the State 
590 
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L.A. OFFICER v. GODREJ & BOYCE 
591 
Government to acquire the lands of the respondent. Under the scheme 
A 
of the Act, neither the notificatiou under section 4 nor the declaration 
under section 6 nor the notice under section 9 is sufficient to divest the 
original owner of, or other person interested in, the land of his rights 
therein. Section 16 makes it clear beyond doubt that the title to the land 
vests in the Government only when possession is taken hy the Govern-
ment, and till that point of time, the land continues to be with the 
B 
original owner and he is also free (except where there is specific legisla-
tion to the contrary) to deal with the land just as he likes. So long as the 
possession is not taken over, the mere fact of a notification issued under 
section 4 or a declaration made under section 6, does not divest the 
owner of his rights in the land to take care of it and confer on the State 
Government any right whatsoever to interfere with the ownership of the 
land or safeguard the interests of the owner. Section 48 gives liberty to C 
the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage 
before the possession of the land is taken by it. By such withdrawal, no 
irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land, and, if at all 
the owner has suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition 
proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto, he will be compensa-
D 
ted therefor under s. 48(2). As held in Trustees of Bai Smarth Jain 
Shvetamber Murtipujak Ganodhaya Trust and Ors. v. State of Gujarat 
and another, AIR 1981 Gujarat 107, the State can be permitted to 
exercise its power of withdrawal nnilaterally. Having regard to the 
scheme of the Act, it is difficult to see why the State Government should 
at all be compelled to give any cogent reasons for its decision not to go 
E 
ahead with the acquisition of any land, as was the view of the High 
Court. It is well settled in the field of specific performance of contracts 
that no person will be compelled to acquire any land, as a breach of a 
contract can always be compensated for by damages. That is also the 
principle of section 48(2) of the Act. [5940-H; 595A-D] 
Even assuming that a withdrawal order under section 48 should 
be backed by reasons and should be bonafide, in the present cas

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