A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
SOW CHANDRA KANTA AND ANOTHER
v,
SHEIK HABIB
March 13, 1975
[V, R. KRISHNA IYER AND R. S. SARKARIA, JJ..]
,
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 137 and Supreme Court Rules, 1966, Order
Xlr-:-Revfew of an order refusing special /eave-Review proceeding, .if amounts
to re-hearing.
Once an' order refusing special leave has been passed by this Court, a review
thereof must be subject to the rules of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, and
cannot be lightly entertained. Review proceeding does not amount to a re-hear-
ing. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper
only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in
earlier by judicial fallibility. Even if the order refusing special leave was capable
of a different course, review of the earlier order is not permissible because such
an order has the normal feature of finality. [933 F-G; 934 BJ
Observation : It is neither fairness to the Court which decided nor awareness
of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waiting in
the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment of
review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost.
(933 HJ
REVIEW JURISDICTION : Review Petition No. 62A of 1974.
Petition for review of this Court's Order dated the 18th January,•
1974 in Spl. Leave Petition No. 2788 of 1973.
q, K. Daphtary, S. K. Dholakia an~R. C. Bhatia, for the petitioner.
S. V. Tambwaker, for the respolndent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J. Mr. Daphtary, learned counsel for the petition-
ers, has argued at length all the points which were urged at the ear-
lier stage when we refused special leave thus making out that
a
review proceeding virtualLy amounts to re-hearing.
May be, we
were not right in refusing special leave in the first round; but, once
an order has been passed by this Court, a review thereof must be
subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained.
A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it
is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like
grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.
A mere repeti-
tion, through different counsel, qt old and over-ruled arguments, a
second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of
inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.
The very strict
need for compliance with these factors is the ratio_nale behind the
insistence of counsel's certificate which should· not be a routine affair
or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which decided
nor ·awareness of the precious public time lost what with a
huge
back-log of dockets waitili1g in the queue for disposal,
for counsel
to issue easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over
aga.in the same battle which has been fought and lost.
The Bench
934
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19751 3 s.c.R.
and the Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of
judicial time for maximum use.
We regret to say that "this case is
typical of the upfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat perfonn-
ance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not
hear then has been heard now, except a couple of rulings on points
earlier put forward.
May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed,
our order refusing special leave was capable of a different course.
The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order
which has the normal feature of finality.
·
We dismiss the petition unhesitatingly, but wi.th these observations,
hopefully. ·
V.M.K.
Review petition dismissed .
A
B
Lex