SONU @ SUBHASH KUMAR versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
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A B C D E F G H 137 [2021] 2 S.C.R. 137 SONU @ SUBHASH KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. (Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 2021) MARCH 01, 2021 [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND M.R. SHAH, JJ.] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Second respondent lodged FIR against the appellant alleging that appellant developed friendship with her and assured that he would marry her – Appellant and second respondent developed physical relationship for about one and a half years and subsequently appellant expressed disinclination to marry her – Charge sheet filed against appellant under s.376 IPC – s.482 application filed by appellant for quashing the charge-sheet – High Court dismissed the application with direction that appellant may move trial court to seek discharge at appropriate stage – Hence instant appeal – Held: To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established – Promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given – The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act – In the instant case, the FIR and statement under s.164 Cr.P.C showed that the relationship between the appellant and second respondent was consensual in nature – There was no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception – On the contrary, the contents of the FIR showed that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave rise to the registration of the FIR – On these facts, the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under s.482 on the basis that it was only the evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was established – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.375, 376. 137 A B C D E F G H 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 2 S.C.R. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The FIR specifically records that the second respondent had developed a friendship with the appellant and that he had assured that he would marry her. The FIR then records that the appellant and the second respondent developed a physical relationship which spread over a period of one and a half years, during the course of which the second respondent conversed with the parents and sister of the appellant. It has been alleged in the FIR that the parents of the appellant were agreeable to the couple getting married. As a matter of fact, the appellant returned to his home town at Jhansi on 5 January 2018 when he had made a phone call to her stating that she should come and visit him so that they can get married. On travelling to Jhansi at the behest of the appellant, the second respondent was informed by the father of the appellant that the appellant did not wish to marry her. The contents of the statement under Section 164 of Cr.PC also indicate that the second respondent had “voluntarily developed relationship of husband-wife with him”. The second respondent has then stated that “now, he and his family members are refusing to marry with me”. The second respondent has further stated that “my sole grievance is that Sonu is refusing to marry with me”. [Para 7][142-B-E] 2. The contents of the FIR as well as the statement under Section 164 of CrPC leave no manner of doubt that, on the basis of the allegations as they stand, three important features emerge: The relationship between the appellant and the second respondent was of a consensual nature; The parties were in the relationship for about a period of one and a half years; and Subsequently, the appellant had expressed a disinclination to marry the second respondent which led to the registration of the FIR. [Para 8][142- F-G] 3. There is no allegation to the effect that the promise to marry given to the second respondent was false at the inception. On the contrary, it would appear from the contents of the FIR that there was a subsequent refusal on the part of the appellant to marry the second respondent which gave rise to the registration A B C D E F G H 139 of the FIR. On these facts, the High Court was in error in declining to entertain the petition under Section 482 of Cr.PC on the basis that it was only the evidence at trial which would lead to a determination as to whether an offence was established. [Para 11][143-E-G
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