LexSOLE TRUSTEE LOKA SHIKSHANA TRUST versus COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MYSORE
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
---,.. __
)
A
B
c
D
E
);'
G
SOLE TRUSTEE LOKA SHIKSHANA TRUST
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MYSORE
August 28, 1975
(fl. R. KHANNA, M. H. BEG AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]
461
lncon1e Tax Act, 19'61, Section 2(15)-Definition of 'Charitable purpose'-
"The advancement of anv other object of f?eneral public utility not invof\·ing the
carr;inR on of any activity for profit', n1eaning of-"Profit'' if confined onlv to
private vrofit.
lnco111e Tax Act, 1961. Sections 2(15) and 11-"Education". 111eani11g a/-
Appellant trust engaged in the business of printing and publication of newspaper
and journals and making profits, if entitled to tax exe1nption.
Section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act provides that 'charitable purpose' in-
cludes relief of the poor, education medical relief. and the advancement of any
other object of general public nti.lity.
The appellant is a sole trustee of the "1-0ka _shikshana ·Trust'', holding pro~
perties mentioned in a schedule attached to a deed of trust executed on 19-2-1962
by himself purporting to re-declare a trust of 15-7-1935. The total assets of the
earlier trust of 1935 consisted of a sum of Rs. 4308.10.9 only. Under the pro-
visions the earlier trust. the trustee had carried on a lucrative business of pr~nt
ing at Bclgaum, and, thereafter, he started publishing a daily newspaper.
The
value of the redeclared trust of 1962 stood at, Rs. 2,97,658/-. Clause 2 of the
trust deed provided that the object of the Trust shall h~ to educate the people of
India in general and of Karnatak in particular by
(a) establishing, conducting and helping directly or indirectly instiluiions
calculated to edncate the people by spread of knowledge on all
matters of general interest and welfare;
(b) founding and running reading rooms and libraries and keeping and
conducting printing houses and publishing or aiding the publicat'.ion
of books, booklets, leaflets, pamphlets, magazines etc., in Kannada
and other languages, all these activities being started, conducted and
carried on with the object of educating the people;
(c) supplyi.ng the Kannada speaking people with an organ or organs of
educated public opinion and conducting journals in
Kannada and
other language for the dissemination of useful news and information
and for the ventilation of public opinion on matters of general public
ntiEty; and
(d) helping directly or indirectly societies and institutions which have all
or any of the aforesaid objects in view.
The Income-tax Officer sent a communication to the trust on April 27, 1963 to
the effect that, s!.nce the only activity of the trust was printing. publication, and
sale of newspaper, weekly and monthly journal, the trust carried on an activity
for profit. The claim of the sole trustee was rejected, and, having been unsuccess-
·,rut through ou~ the appellant has preferred thi5 appeal after certification of the
case under section 261 of the Income-tax Act. J9()L
Dismissing the appeal,
H
HELD: (Per H. R. Khanna and A. C. Gu9ta, JJ.)
(I) It is not correct to say that the word "profit" in section 2(15) of the Act
means private profit. The word used in the de:fin~tion provision is profit and not
private profit and it \\-'Ould not be permissible to read in the definition the word
16-U39 Sup. C 1/75
4 62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
11976] I S.C.R.
"private" as q~alifying profit even though su::h word is not the:·e.
There is al-....l
no apparent justification or cogent reason for placing much a construct:on on the
word .. P ofit'".
[47281
The words "general
pµrpose are very .. wide. public utility" contained 1n 1he definition of charitaqle
These words exclede objects of p:-1vale gain.
l472C]
A II India Sp/1111crs' Association v. Commissioner of I ncon1e·tax { 1944)
2
I.T.R. 482, relied on.
'
lt. is also not correct to say that the newly added words "not involvincr the
car~y.1ng on .of any. activity for profit" merely qualify and affirm what \Va~ the
pos1tLon as It obtained under the _definition in the Act of .1922.
Ji' the 1egis~
]ature intended that the concept of charitable purpose should be the·sam~ under
the Act of 196 l as it was in the Act of 1922, there was no necessitv for it
to add the new words in the definition.
The earlier definition did not' involve
any ambiguity. and the position in law was clear and admitted of no doubt
after the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in the Tribune case ( 1939)
7 ITR 415 ~lnd in the case of Aft JExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.