LexSODAN SINGH ETC. ETC. versus NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANR. ETC.
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SODAN SINGH ETC. ETC.
v.
NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANR. ETC.
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AUGUST 30, 1989
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[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, CJ., S. NATARAJAN, LAUT
MOHAN SHARMA, N.D. OJHA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.J
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 19( 1)(g)-Street trading-
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An age old vocation adopted by human beings to earn living-No "'\
justification to deny citizens right to earn livelihood using public streets
c for trade or business-Regulatory measures and reasonable restrictions
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can be imposed.
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957: Street trading-Neces-
sity to provide regulatory measures-Emphasised.
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Punjab Municipal Act, 1911: Street trading-Necessity to provide
regulatory measures-Emphasised.
The petitioners in these special leave petitions and writ petitions
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claim the right to engage in trading business on the pavements of roads
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of the city of Delhi. The special leave petitions are against the judgments
of the Delhi High Court dismissing their claim.
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It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that (i) they were
allowed by the respondents to transact their bnsiness by occnpying a
particular area on the pavements on payment of certain charges
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described as Tehbazari and the refusal by the municipal authorities to
permit them to continue with their trade is violative of their funda-
mental right guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution; and
(ii) the petitioners are poor people and depend on their business for
their livelihood and if they are not allowed to occupy some specific
places demarcated on the pavements on a permanent basis for conduct-
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ing their business they may starve which will lead to violation of their
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
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The respondents, on the other hand, contend that nobody bas got
a legal right to occupy exclusively a particular area on the road-pave-
ment for pursuing a trading business and nobody can claim any funda-
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mental right in this regard whatsoever.
1038
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SODAN SINGH v. N.D.M.C.
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Disposing of the petitions and remitting the cases to the appro-
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priate Division Bench for final disposal in accordance with this judg-
ment, this Court,
HELD: E.S. Venkataramiah, CJ, S. Natarajan, L.M. Sharma
and N.D. Ojha ,JJ.]
Per L.M. Sharma, J.
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(1) A member of the public is entitled to legitimate user of the
road ·other than actually passing or re-passing through it, provided
that he does not create an unreasonable obstruction which may in-
convenience other persons having ·similar right to pass and does not
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make excessive use of the road to the prejudice of the others. Liberty
of an individual comes to an end where the liberty of another
commences. [IOSOC, A-Bl
(2) What will constitute public nuisance and what can be included ·
in the legitimate user can be ascertained only by taking into account all
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the relevant circumstances including the size of the road, the amount of
traffic and the nature of the additional use one wants to make of the
public streets. This has to be judged objectively and here comes the role
of public authorities. [IOSJE)
(3) The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article
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19(l)(g) of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated,
cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively
for passing or re-passing and for no other use. Proper regulation is,
however, a necessary condition as otherwise the very object of laying
out roads--to facilitate traffic-may be defeated. Allowing the right to
trade without appropriate control is likely to lead to unhealthy competi-
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tion and quarrel between traders and travelliui; public and sometimes
amongst the traders themselves resulting in chaos. The right is subject
to reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19. [1052C-D)
( 4) The proposition that all public streets and roads in India vest
in the State but that the,,State holds them as trustee on behalf of the
public and the member{of the public are entitled as beneficiaries to use
them as a matter of right, and that this right is limited only by the
similar rights possessed by every other citizens to use the pathways and
further that the State as trustee is entitled to impose all necessary limi-
tations on the character and extent of the user, should be treated as of
universal application. The provisions of the Municipal Acts should be
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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