SMT. RASHMI KUMAR versus MARESH KUMAR BHADA
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SMT. RASHMI KUMAR v. MARESH KUMAR BHADA DECEMBER 18, 1996 [K. RAMASWAMY, S.B. MAJMUDAR AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.] Hindu law: A B "Stridhana''-Meaning and nature of-Held : Wife absolute owner of C stridhana property-Not a joint property of wife and husband. Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 405 and 406. "Stridhana" property-Entrustment of-To husband or other member of family-Dishonest misappropriation or conversion-To own use-Of that D property by husband or other member--Held: By itself amounted to criminal breach of trust-No further agreement that such property was given to husband or other member off amily need be established-Wlten wife left matrimonial home or driven therefrom proof of entrustment of stridhana property depended, upon circumstances of each case-In the circumstances of the case, prim a f acie entrustment was made out by wife as stridhana properties not E returned by her husband. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 200. Cognizance of offence-Taking of-Held : Court must consider only avennents made in complaint or charge-sheet-Not open for court to sift and F appreciate evidence at that stage. Sections 468 and 472--Limitation--Offence under S.406 IPC-Aver- ment in complaint-That complaint demanded from accused return of her stridhana properties on 5-12-1987-Accused did not return said stridhana G prope1ties--Complaint filed on 10-9-199(}--Held : Complaint was not time barred-In view of this finding question whether it was a continuing offence not decided. Section 482--C1imi11al Proceedings--Quashing of-Power of High Court-Held : Should be sparingly and cautiously exercised to prevent mis- H 347 348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. A carriage of justice or when it would tantamount to abuse of process of court-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226. B Words and Phrases : "St1idhana"-Meaning of-In the context of Hindu Law. ''Entrustment''-Meaning of-lnthe context of S.405 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The appellant was married to the respondent according to the Hindu C rites and rituals and had three children from the wedlock. The appellant- wife was given jewellery, i.e., gold and silver ornaments and other household goods and also cash by the appellant's parents, brothers and other relatives at different ceremonies prior to the appellant's marriage and after the marriage at the time of bidai (farewell). The appellant- wife had entrusted all her stridhana properties and household goods to the D respondent-husband for safe custody. The appellant was treated with cruelty in the matrimonial home and ultimately the appellant and the children were thrown out from the matrimonial home without getting an opportunity to take with her stridhana properties and household goods. The appellant filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu E Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. Thereafter, the appellant requested the respondent-husband to restitute the appellant into the con- jugal society along with the children. The respondent promised to do so provided the appellant withdrew the application for restitution of conjugal rights, which the appellant .did. Even after withdrawing the application the F respondent did not take the appellant into the conjugal society. The appellant then made a demand for return of the stridhana properties during October 1986 but the respondent refused to do so. The appellant made a demand on 5-12-1987 to return her stridhana properties but the respondent refused to do so. Consequently, the appellant filed a G private complaint on 10- 9-1990 under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. After recording the statement of the appellant the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 200 of the Code. In the meanwhile the respondent filed an application under Section 482 of the Code in the H High Court to quash the proceedings. The High Court quashed the RASHMI KR. v. M.K. BHADA 349 proceedings on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Hence this A appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the offence under Section 406 IPC was a continuing offence and hence cause of action arose every day subsequent to the refusal and, therefore, the complaint was not barred by limitation. B On behalf of the respondent it was contended that a clear demand for return of stridhana properties was made in October 1986 when the respondent had refused to return the same; that the c
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