SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS. versus MILKHI RAM

Citation: [1990] 1 S.C.R. 278 · Decided: 08-02-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS. 
v. 
MILKHI RAM 
FEBRUARY 8, 1990 
[K. JAGANNATHA SHEITY AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.] 
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section 2(h)(i) 
'Tenant'-Meaning and scope of-Whether includes a person claiming 
to be a tenant. 
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Section 13(2)(i)-Proviso-Tendering of rent arrears-Benefit 
available to a person claiming to be a tenant-Existence of admitted 
jural relationship of landlord and tenant not necessary. 
>
Statutory interpretation: Statute-interpretation c/ause--Defini-
)'
lion of a word-Governs that word used in the Statute unless the context 
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requires 
otherwise-'The 
context'-'lnternal 
context'-'External 
context'-What is. 
The respondent-landlord filed an eviction petition agaiitst the 
appellants under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction 
Act, 1949 on the grounds of arrears of rent, sub-letting and makiitg 
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material alterations impairing the utility of the building. On the first 
date of hearing before the Rent Controller the appellants tendered the 
arrears of rent but the respondent-landlord refused to accept it on the 
ground that the tender of rent was not valid since it included rent on 
behalf of a disputed tenant. Accepting the case ol' unauthorised sub-
letting the Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition holding that the 
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rent tendered was not in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2)(i) of 
section 13 because only the undisputed tenant alone ought to have 
tendered the rent. 
The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on the preliminary 
point of validity of tendering of rent, holding that the rent deposited by 
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the appellants was not valid, since one of the appellants was a stranger. 
The High Court confirmed the order of the appellate authority by 
dismissing the tenant's revision in limine. 
In the appeal to this Court on the question, whether the word 
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'tenant' included a person claiming to be a tenant, allowing the appeal, 
this Court, 
278 
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PUSHPA DEVI v. MILKHI RAM 
279 
HELD: I. When a word has been defined in the interpretation 
clause, prima facie that definition governs wherever that word is used In 
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the body of the Statute unless the context requires otherwise. The 
context is both internal and external. The internal context requires the 
interpreter to situate ·the disputed words within the section of which 
they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act. The external 
context involves determining the meaning from ordinary linguistic 
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usage (including any special technical meanings) from the purpose 
for which the provision was passed, and from the place of the pro-
visions within the general scheme of statutory and common law rules 
and principles. [286E-G l 
• 
Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. p. 48, referred to. 
I.I Even where the definition is exhaustive in as much as the 
word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word 
to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act· 
depending upon the subject or context. [2878] 
Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s Fraser and 
Ross & Anr., [1960] 3 SCR 857, followed. 
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2. The opening sentence in the definition of Section 2 of the East 
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 states "unless there is 
anything repugnant in the subject or co,ntext". In view of this quali-
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fications, the Court has not only to look at the words but also to 
examine the context and collocation in the light of the object of the 
Act and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by the 
Legislature. [286G-H] 
3. The apparent purpose of the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) was to F 
relieve the defaulting tenant from the extreme penalty of eviction. The 
provision is analogous to Section IJ4 of the Transfer of Property Act, 
1882 which confers discretion on the Court to grant relief against forfei-
ture for non-payment of rent. But the proviso goes a step further. and 
leaves no such discretion to the controller or Court even if the tenant is 
a constant defaulter. If the arrears and other amounts specified are G 
paid or tendered on the first date of hearing, the default as a ground for 
eviction disappears and the Controller is precluded from passing a 
d!ecree for eviction. The governing principle of the proviso is that the 
tenant could pay and stay an action for eviction on default. At the same 
time, the landlord is ensured payment of arrears, interest and the costs 
that he has incurred 

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