SMT. PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA versus STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH. (NOW MADHYA PRADESH)

Citation: [1961] 3 S.C.R. 907 · Decided: 21-02-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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3 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
SMT. PADMINI KUNWAR JU SAHIBA 
!!. 
STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH. 
(now Madhya Pradesh) 
(P. B. G AJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and 
K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) 
907 
Jagif Abolition-] agirdar-ljaredar, meaning of-Lambardari 
least, if ]agir-Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of ]agirs and Land 
Reforms Act, I952 (II of I952), s. 2(I)(c). 
In 1945 the Ruler of Panna granted a " Lambardari lease" 
in certain villages to the appellant. By a notification dated 
January l, 1954· issued under the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of 
Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952, the respondent resumed the 
appellant's right. The appellant contended that she was not a 
jagirdar within the meaning of the Act and the notification was 
without the authority of law. The respondent contended that 
the appellant was an "Ijaredar" and fell within the inclusive 
.. 
part of the definition of "Jagirdar" in s. 2(1)(c). 
Held, that the appellant was not a Jagirdar and her right 
under the Lambardari lease could not be resumed under the 
Abolition Act. In the context in which the word "Ijaredar" 
was used ins. 2(1)lc) it meant a person holding an Ijara which 
was a lease or farm of land revenue or other proprietary right as 
distinguished from other kinds of leases. The Lambardari lease 
granted ~the appellant was not a mere farm of land revenue but 
it conferred~ghts in the land itself. It was not a mere Ijara, the 
appellant was not a mere "Ijaredar" and was not covered by the 
definition of Jagifdar in s. 2(1)(c). 
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955] 2 S.C.R. 303, 
applied. 
ClvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 
250of1956. 
Appeal from the judgment and order dated Janu-
ary 17, 1955, of the former Judicial Commissioner's 
Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in Misc. Civil Writ Applica-
tion No. 105 of 1954. 
G. 8. Pathak and G. 0. Mathur for the appellant. 
B. Ganapathy Iyer and B. H. Dhebar for the respond-
ent. 
1961. February 21. The Judgment of the Court WM 
delivered by 
116 
1961 
908 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[19.61] 
x96x 
W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate 
. . granted by the Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya. 
Smt.Pcdm1n1 
p d h 
Th b. ff 
fi 
Ku wa Ju Sahiba ra es . 
e rte acts necessary or present pur-
. 
" 
~-
poses are these: The appellant filed a petition under 
State of 
Art. 226 of the. Constitution praying that the order of 
Vindhya Pradesh the Deputy Commissioner, Panna, issued on Decem-
ber 29, 1953, to the effect that the appellant's rights 
Wanchoo J. 
in certain villages would be resumed from January l, 
1954, in pursuance of the notification of the Govern-
ment of Vindhya Pradesh dated December 20, 1953, 
under s. 5 of the Vihdhya P~adesh Abolition of Jagirs 
and Land Reforms Act, No. XI of 1952 (~ereinafter 
called the Act) resuming all jagirs with a gross annual 
:ncome of Rs. 1,000/- or above, be quashed. 
The 
appellant's case was that she was granted as a special 
case a Lambardari·lease in certain villages by His 
Highness the Maharaja of Panna on December 7, 1945, 
for a period of thirty years and had been in possession 
thereof in accordance with the terms of the lease. 
The appellant contended that she. was not· a jagirdar 
within the meaning of the Act and thus the said noti-
fication did not apply to her lands and the order issued 
by the Deputy Commissioner under the said notifica-
tion was therefore without the authority of law and 
liable to be quashed. She contended further that she 
was not a jagirdar under any law, rules, regulations 
or orders governing jagirdars irl force in any part of 
the State, and therefore her lands could not be 
resumed in the manner in which the resumption-had 
been made. 
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State 
and it was contended that the appellant was a jagirdar 
within the meaning of that term in the Act. The 
learned Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant 
was an Ijaredar and therefore a jagirdar within the 
meaning of s. 2 (1) (c) of the Act. In oonsequenoe he 
dismissed the petition. An application was then ma.de 
for a certificate to appeal to th!a,Court, which was 
granted and that is how the appeal has come up 
before us. 
The only q uestiou that falls for our decision is 
whether the appellant can be said to be an Ijareda,r 
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3 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
909 
within the meaning of s.·2 (1) (c) of the Act. A 
"ja.girdar " is defined in s. 2 ( 1) ( c) a.s meaning 
smt. Padminl 
"any person recognised as a J agird

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