LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

SMT. MOUMITA PODDAR versus INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ANR.

Citation: [2010] 9 S.C.R. 905 · Decided: 30-07-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

[2010] 9 S.C.R. 905 
SMT. MOUMITA PODDAR 
v. 
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ANR. 
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6071-6072 of 2010) 
JULY 30, 2010 
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CYRIAC JOSEPH AND SURINDER 
SINGH NIJJAR, JJ.] 
A 
B 
Public Distribution System - Appointment/selection of 
Retail Outlet Dealership of petrol -
Challenged by the C 
applicant who was not selected - Single Judge of High Court 
cancelling the entire selection on account of non-observance 
of policy guidelines - Division Bench of High Court upheld 
the appointment -
On appeal, held: The selection/ 
appointment was vitiated as the Selection Committee failed o 
to observe the policy guidelines as laid down in the policy 
circular ..,. The appellant-applicant was also not eligible for 
selection in view of the policy guidelines - However, setting 
aside of entire selection process is not justified - The proper 
course is to offer the dealership to the next candidate on the 
E 
panel - In view of the fact that the candidates in the panel 
have not challenged the selection and in view of the 
subsequent events that entire infrastructure has been made 
available and the dealership is uperating for more than five 
years, the selection/appointment of the dealership is not 
interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of F 
the Constitution - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 -
Adminstrative Law - Policy Guidelines - Non-observance by 
Selection Committee - Effect of -
Subsequent events -
consideration of 
Respondent-Corporation published notice for 
appointment of Retail Outlet Dealership. The appellant 
applied for the dealership and offered to set up the 
dealership on the land purchased by her mother-in-law 
G 
905 
H 
906 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2010] 9 S.C.R. 
A and father-in-law and also furnished documents 
expressing their willingness to allow the appellant to use 
the land for installation of the Retail Outlet Dealership and 
to lease out the same to respondent No. 1 on long term 
basis. Respondent No. 2 also submitted her application 
B indicating that she had suitable site readily available for 
the dealership. She offered the Lease Deed. However, 
one of the clauses of the Lease Deed mentioned that she 
could not sub-let the leased out landed property. In a 
further supplementing Lease Agreement, it was provided 
c that the party had the right to create sub-tenancy. Both 
the above Lease Deeds were, however, not registered. 
After the interview of the applicants, three candidates 
were empanelled. Respondent No. 2 was placed at serial 
No. 1. The appellant was not empanelled. Letter of intent 
0 
was issued in favour of respondent No. 2. The same was 
challenged by the appellant before High Court in a writ 
petition. Another unsuccessful candidate also challenged 
the selection of respondent No. 2 in a writ petition. Both 
the writ petitions were allowed holding that the selection 
E was contrary to the applicable policy guidelines. and that 
the entire selection process was vitiated on the ground 
of non-application of mind and arbitrariness. The court 
also held that the Lease Deed offered by respondent No. 
2 was not in existence at the time of interview but was 
subsequently, i.e. long after the filing of the writ petition, 
F 
manufactured to defeat the case of the appellant. Writ 
appeals against the same were allowed. Therefore, the 
instant appeals were filed. 
G 
Dismissing the appeals, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 From the fact3 of the case, neither the 
appellant nor respondent No.2 would have been eligible 
for any preference. Whilst the appellant had offered the 
undertakings given by her mother-in-law and father-in-law 
to make the land available on lease, respondent No.2 
H was only in possession of a lease, which contained a 
MOUMITA PODDAR v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION 
907 
LTD. 
negative covenant. Therefore, the candidature of both, the A 
appellant as well as respondent No.2 co~d on~ be 
considered under the category that they were pre ared 
to make the site available. The eligibility and the rel tive 
merit of the candidate was clearly to be adjudged o~ the 
basis of the criteria contained in the policy circular dated 
B 
4.9.2003. [Paras 22, 23] [927-A-D] 
1.2 Both, on the date of the application and the date 
of the interview, respondent No.2 did not fall within any 
of the categories as laid down in Circular dated 4.9.2003. 
Therefore, her selection was vitiated, as the Selection C 
Committee has deviated from the criteria laid

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.