SMT. MAQBOOL FATMA AND ORS. versus DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, EVACUEE PROPERTY AND ANR.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 436 · Decided: 10-07-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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SMT. MAQBOOL FATMA AND ORS. 
v. 
DEPUTY CUSTODIAN GENERAL, EVACUEE 
PROPERTY AND ANR. 
JULY 10, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950: Section 27. 
Revision--Period of limitation for-Displaced person-Evacuee propel' 
ty-Order passed vesting evacuee property in custodian-Order communicated 
to all major shareholders for infonnation-Revision filed after 14 years-Ad-
ditional Custodian General declining to inteifere with order-High Court 
holding that Additional Custodian General properly exercised his discre-
tion-Appeal to Supreme Court-Held view taken by High Court was cor-
reel-Revision power should be exercised keeping in view the rights of the 
parties and effect of exercise of powe1-ln this case petitioners had slept over 
their property 1ights for over 14 years-In the nieantin1e persons in possession 
had pe1fected their title by prescription-Revision application was rightly 
rejected. 
Purshotam Lal Dhawan v. Diwan Chaman Lal, AIR (1961) SC 1371, 
relied on. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition No. 
14717 of 1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.1.91 of the Allahabad High 
Court in C.W.P. No. 4770 of 1976. 
B.U. Barqi, Z.K. Faizan, Anis Suhrawardy for the Petitioners. 
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The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Delay condoned. 
This Special Leave Petition arises against the judgment and order of 
the High Court of Allahabad made on January28, 1991 in C.W.P. No. 4770 
H of 1976. The admitted position is that one Ashfaq Hussain was an evacuee 
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MAQBOOLFA1MA v. DY. CUSTODIAN GENERAL 
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having migrated to Pakistan. His properly was vested in the Custodian 
under U.P. Custodian of Evacuee properties Act. Thereafter the Central 
Act had taken over the operation of the evacuee properties. The records 
disclose that the Assistant Custodian, Farrukhabad at Kanpur had passed 
an order dated June 22, 1961 in which il was held that the interest of 
Ashfaq Hussain had been shown as evacuee interest and it was directed 
that the order be communicated to all the major shareholders for informa-
tion. It was found that the order was accordingly communicated to all the 
major shareholders. Admittedly, a revision application came to be filed on 
August 16, 1975, that is, practically after 14 years under Section 27 of the 
Administration of the Evacuee Properties Act, 1950 (for short, the "Act"). 
The Additional Custodian General had declined to interfere with the 
order. When the petitioner had called that order in question in the writ 
petition, the High Court held that the Additional Custodian General had 
properly exercised the revisional jurisdiction and it declined lo interfere 
with the order due to the inordinate delay in filing the revision. Thus this 
special leave petition. 
It is sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner 
that the judgment relied upon by the High Court is not of any help to the 
view taken by the High Court and that, therefore, the High Court was not 
right in its conclusion. This Court in Purshotam Lal Dhawan v. Diwan 
Chaman Lal, AIR (1961) SC 1371 has held that Section 27 of the Ad-
ministration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1950 does not prescribe any period 
of limitation, but Rule 31 (5) prescribes limitation of 60 days for filing an 
appeal and that it would provide as guide to the revisional authorities to 
exercise the revisional power reasonably and fairly. Jn that case, entertain-
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ing the revision within one year was held to be not unreasonable. In that 
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behalf, this Court has held that the powers of the Custodian General under 
Section 27 read with Rule 31(5) are not intended to be exercised arbitrarily. 
Being a judicial power, he shall exercise his discretion reasonably and it is 
for him to consider whether in a particular case he should entertain a 
revision beyond the period of sixty days stated in Rule 31(5). It was held 
that the exercise of the revisional powers after one year was held to be not G 
unreasonable. 
It is seen that the petitioners had slept over the rights over the 
property \Vell over 14 years by which time even the persons in possession 
had perfected their title by prescription. Under those circumstances, a H 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
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person who was not diligent in exercising his rights and allowed third party 
rights to accrue. cannot be permitted to agitate the right after an inordinate 
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