SMT. GIAN KAUR ETC. ETC. versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1996] 3 S.C.R. 697 · Decided: 21-03-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. VERMA · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

SMT. GIAN KAUR ETC. ETC. 
A 
v. 
THE STATE OF PUNJAB ETC. ETC. 
MARCH 21, 1996 
[J.S. VERMA, G.N. RAY, N.P. SINGH, FAIZAN UDDIN 
B 
AND G.T. NANA VAT!, JJ.] 
Constitution of India, 1950 : 
~ 
A1ticle 21--lnterpretation of-Right to life-Scope of-Held does not C 
include right to die-Any aspect which makes life dignified is included in right 
to life but not that which extinguishes it-Negative aspects included in other 
freedoms under Anicle 19-Held inapplicable to Article 21. 
Indian Penal Code, 1860: 
Section 309--Suicide-Attempt--Pwiishment fo,.._provision held not 
violative of Arlie/es 14 and 21. 
Y 
Section 306-Abetment of suicide-Punishment fo,.._provision held not 
D 
unconstitutional--Abetment of suicide and attempt to suicide-Held two 
distinct offences-Held Section 306 can survive independent of Section 309. 
E 
The appellant and her hnsband were convicted by the trial Conrt 
under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for abetting the commission 
of suicide. Their conviction was upheld by the High Court. In appeal to 
this Court it was contended that 'right to die' being included in Article 21 
of the Constitutio.n as held in P. Rathinam v. Union of India & Anr., [1994) 
3 SCC 394 declaring Section 309 IPC to be unconstitutional, any person 
abetting the commission of suicide by another is merely assisting in the 
enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 21; and, therefore, 
Section 306 !PC penalising assisted suicide is equally violative of Article 
F 
21. In view of the fact that the argument was based on the decision in P. G 
Rathinam's case the Court felt the need to reconsider that decision. 
Accordingly the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench along 
with the connected appeals. 
On the questions (i) whether Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian H 
697 
698 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1996] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
Penal Code, 1860 are constitntionally valid and (ii) whether 'right to life' 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution includes 'right to die' : 
Disposing of the appeals this Court 
HELD : 1. Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not violative 
B of Article 21 of the Constitution. [720-B-C] 
2. Article 21 is a provision guaranteeing protection of life and per-
sonal liberty and by no stretch of imagination can 'extinction of life' be read 
to be included in 'protection of life'. Whatever may be the philosophy of 
C permitting a person to extinguish his life by committing suicide, it is dif-
Ii. 
ficult to construe Article 21 to include within it the 'right to die' as a part of 
the fundamental right guaranteed therein. 'Right to life' is a natural right 
embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction 
of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of 
'right to life'. When a man commits suicide he has to undertake certain 
D positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to, or be 
included within the protection of the 'right to life' under Article 21. The 
significant aspect of sanctity of lite is not to be overlooked. [711-E-F] 
3. There is no similarity in the nature of the other rights, such as 
E the right to 'freedom of speech' etc. to provide a comparable basis to hold 
that the 'right to life' also includes the 'right to die'. The comparison is 
inapposite. The interpretation of Article 21 made in P. Rathinam's case 
cannot be agreed to. The only reason for which Section 309 is held to be 
violative of Article 21 in P. Rathinam's case does not withstand legal 
scrutiny. [711-G; 712-H] 
F 
4. To give meaning and content to the word 'life' in Article 21, it has 
been construed as life with human dignity. Any aspect of life which makes 
it dignified may be read into it but not that which extinguishes it and is, 
therefore, inconsistent with the continued existence of life resulting in 
G effacing the right itself. The 'right to die', if any, is inherently inconsistent 
with the 'right to die' as is 'death' with 'life'. [712-A-B] 
S. Protagonism of euthanasia on the view that existence in persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) is not a benefit to the patient of a terminal illness 
being unrelated to the principle of 'sanctity of life' or the 'right to live with 
H dignity' is of no assistance to determine the scope of Article 21 for deciding 
,· 
; 
G. KAUR v. STATE 
699 
whether the guarantee of 'right to life' therein includes the 'right to die'. The A 
'right to life' including the right to live with hum
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