SMT DEOKABAI versus UTTAM

Citation: [1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 409 · Decided: 27-07-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. PUNCHHI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

SMT DEOKABAI 
v. 
UTT AM 
JULY 27, 1993 
[MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND YOGESHWAR DAYAL, .TJ.] 
Specific Relief Act, 1963 : Agreement to sell immovable proper-
ty-Terms of agreement providing execution of sale deed after obtaining 
permission of Competent Authority and seller getting suitable alternative 
accommodation--Difficulty in getting alternative accommodation-Effect 
of-Doctrine of Frustration-Whether applicable-Whether seller obliged to 
part with the property by effecting the sale. 
Interpretation of Deeds & Documents-Terms of a document-To be 
read as a whole-Taking out a tenn in isolation-Giving it a meaning tom 
A 
B 
c 
from the context could lead to wrong interpretation. 
D 
In January, 1979, the appellant entered into an agreement with the 
respondent for sale of a portion of her house, the important terms of the 
agreement being that the appellant would get the necessary permission of 
the sale from the Competent Authority and after that when she would get 
another suitable house, she would get the sale deed registered in the name 
of the respondent. The appellant accordingly obtained permission from the 
Competent Authority in May, 1979. On 9.7.1979, respondent sent a notice 
to the appellant requiring her to get the sale deed registered in his favour 
on the same day and to remain present in the Office of the Registrar for 
the said purpose. Since the appellant failed to do so, the respondent filed 
a· suit for specific performance. The alternative claim of the respondent 
was fo;
1 return of the earnest money of Rs.5000 with interest. The Trial 
Court held that the respondent was entitled to the relief of specific perfor-
mance. 
E 
F 
On appeal, a Single Judge of the High Court negatived the claim for G 
specific performance but decreed the suit for the refund of Rs.5000 along 
with interest @ 8% per annum. On further appeal, a Division Bench of the 
High Court decreed the suit for specilic performance. However, it affirmed 
the view of the Single Judge that the term in the agreement regarding the 
appellant getting another suitable house was not a condition precedent to H 
409 
410 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1993] SUPP.1 S.C.R. 
A the execution of the sale. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant 
preferred the present appeal, wbich is confined to the interpretation of th• 
said term in the agreement. 
On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that whatever be the 
alleged cause of frustration, a contract could not be discharged under the 
B doctrine of frustration when a contract became onerous merely because of 
the difficulty to perform the same was onerous. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. It is well settled that the terms of a document have to be 
C read as a whole. Taking out a term in isolation and giving it a meaning 
torn from the context may tend to lead to a wrong interpretation causing 
injustice. (413-AJ 
2. In the instant case it is clear that the parties had appreciated and 
D recognised the appellant's need to have another suitable house and that 
there could arise a difficulty on that score in transferring the house if a 
suitable honse could not be available within a reasonable time. Such an 
important term, specifically included had a positive safeguarding meaning. 
(413-E-F) 
E 
3. No frustration as such is involved when the parties are put to 
observe what they were required to under the contract. Viewed in this 
context, close to the heels of the permission granted by the Competent 
Authority the respondent conld not have unabashedly hounded the appel-
lant to execute the sale deed, knowing fully well her need to obtain another 
suitable accommodation, ignoring her difficulty on that account. Snch 
F conduct of the respondent was highly objectionable and unreasonable, 
disentitling him to seek relief of specific performance for sale of the house 
in question. The respondent in the situation, could not straightway ask the 
appellant in to specifically perform the contract unless he initially had put 
the appellant to notice to seek and get another suitable accommodation 
G within a reasonable time within which it could reasonably be available. 
Snch a notice obviously could be given only after the grant of permission 
by the Competent Authority to sell the house, because in the event of 
non-grant of permission the search for another suitable accommodation 
would have become unnecessary. [419-F-H; 415-A] 
H 
4. In the facts and circumstances, the two terms afore-

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