LexSMT. DAYAWATI AND ANOTHER versus INDERJIT AND OTHERS
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A B c D • ill .. E F G II sm. DAYAWATI AND ANOTHER v. INDERJIT AND OTHERS I anuary 14, 1966 [K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND R. S. BACH>.WAT, JJ.l, UsurloW1 Loans Act, 1918 (10 of 1918), s. 3, as amended bys. 5 of Punjab Rellej oj Indebtedness Act-Section 6 of latter Act making s. S applicable to "all suitJ pending or to be instituted after the COrnm<!lfC<- ment of this Acf'-Appeal filed against judgment in suit-Whether suit 'pending' within meaning of s. 6. Interest in excess of 7! per cent was awarded to the appellants by the trial court in a mortgage suit against the respondents. The respondents filed before the High Court, wbere an appeal by them against the decree of the trial court was pending an application under s. 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 as amended by s. S of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act. They claimed, by virtue of the latter provision, that interest in excels of 7i per cent could not be awarded in the suit. The Hilh Court having accepted the contention, the appellants came to this Court by special leave and contended that an appeal having been filed against the trial court's judgment in the suit, the said suit could not be said to be pending' within tho meaning of s. 6 of the Punjab Act on the relevant date, and therefore s. S would not apply . HELD: (i) Tho word 'suit' includes an appeal from the judgment in the suit. The only difference between a suit and an appeal is that an appeal "only reviews and corrects the proceedin8" in a cause already constituted but dO<lS not create the cause." In the present Act the intention is to g;..., relief in respect of excessive interest in a suit which is pendina and a preliminary decree in a suit of this kind does not terminate the suit. The appeal is a part of the cause because the preliminary decree which emerges from the appeal will be the decree, which can become a final decree. (281 D-F) (ii) The words of s. 6 speak of a suit pending on the commencement of the Act and it means a live suit whether in tne court of first instance or an appeal court where the judgment of ·the court of first instance is being considered. It only excludes those suits in which nothina further needs to be done in relation to the rights and claim litigated, because an executable decree which may not be reopened is already in existence. The decision of the High Court was right in applying s. 3 of the Usurious Loans Act (as amended) to the case. (282 A, BJ (iii) Ordinarily a court of appeal cannot take into account a new law, brought into existence after the Judgment appealed from ha• been rendered, because the rights of the litigants in an appeal are determined under the law in force at the dste of the suit. Matters of procedure are however different and the law affecting procedure is always retr05~ive. But it does not mean that there is an absolute rule of inviolab11ity of mbstantive rights. If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear lntendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even afler the judgment of the court of first instance, The distinction between laws affecting procedure and tlto•e affecting vested rights does not matter wbea the court is)nvited by law lo take away from a ~ plaintil!, what· he has obtal!led under a judgment. (280 B-Hl 276 SllPRHIF COURT REPORTS [ 1966] 3 S.C.R. Quilter v. Mapleson, (1882)9 Q.B.D. 672, Slavin v. Falrbrass (1919)88 ,.\ LJ. K.B. 1004 and Mukerjee (K.C.) v. Mst. Ramratan, 63 I.A. 47, refer· red to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated October 15, 1959 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in R.F.A. No. 1-D of 1954. S. T. Desai, D. R. Prem and Mohan Beharilal, for the appel· !ants. N. C. Chatterjee, and H. P. Wanchoo, for respondents Nos. to 5. Tiry11gi Narain, for respondent No. 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B c Hidayalullah, J. In this appeal by special leave against the judgment and decree of the Punjab High Court dated October 15, D 1959 the only question is whether, in the facts to be stated pre- sently, the High Court was right in reducing interest m a preli· minary mortgage decree dated August 12, 1953 by applying ss. 5 and 6 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act which were extended to Delhi on June 8, 1956. On January 17,
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