SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN ETC. versus VADILAL BAPALAL MODI & OTHERS.

Citation: [1989] 2 S.C.R. 232 · Decided: 30-03-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.H. KANIA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN ETC. 
v. 
VADILAL BAPALAL MODI & OTHERS. 
MARCH 30, 1989 
[M.H. KANIA AND L.M. SHARMA, JJ.] 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61and114. 
~ 
Books of account-Entries-Proof of-Nobody supporting 
correctness of entries-Account books liable to be rejected. 
Title-Proof-Presumption on basis of revenue entry-When 
arises. 
Limitation Act, 1963. Article 65-Adverse possession-Proof-
Actual physical possession by claimant not necessary-Fact that pro-
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perty was in possession of tenants would be of no consequence. 
Indian Contract Act, 1872. Sections 182 and 188-Joint posses-
sion-Claim by agent-Agent actually collecting rent from tenants-
Cannot claim joint possession of property. 
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Respondent No. 1 in the appeals instituted a suit for partition 
against his younger brothers and sisters, and the heirs of his deceased 
brothers. The plaintiff was the eldest among the brothers and sisters. 
The 1st and 2nd Defendants were his brothers, the 3rd Defendant his 
sister, the 4th and 5th Defendants, the widow and son respectively of 
the third brother. Defendant 6 was the widow of the fourth brother, and 
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Defendants 7 to 12 were his children, while Defendant No. 14 was the 
wife of Defendant No. 1, and Defendants 13, 15, 16 and 17 were their 
children. 
The subject matter of the appeals related only to one item of 
property known as "Naroda Chawl" measuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas 
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of land, where 115 rooms and huts stood constructed, out of which 114 
rooms had been let out to tenants, and one room was retained for the 
caretaker. 
According to Defendants No. 6 to 12 this property exclusively 
belonged to defendant No. 6 and was not liable to partition. The other 
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defendants however supported the plaintiff's case that it belonged to the 
232 
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI 
233 
joint family and was liable to partition. 
Defendants 6 to 12 pleaded that the plaintiff's father-Bapalal 
orally gifted this property to his daughter-in-law Defendant No. 6 in 
March 1946 and made a statement before the Revenue authorities on 
the basis of which her name was mutated and she was put in possession 
thereof, that although she came in peaceful possession, the management 
which included realisation of rent was in the hands of Defendant No. 1, 
that as some dispute arose in 1952 she assumed direct charge of the 
chaw I and had remained in possession thereafter, and that she had 
acquired good title therein by adverse possession before the suit was 
filed in 1960. 
The City Civil Judge who tried the suit, held that there was a joint 
Hindu family and a business was carried on for the benefit of the family 
and the income therefrom was thrown into the common pool and all the 
properties including the disputed chaw! were treated as belonging to the 
family. As the case of Defendant No. 6 about the gift, the mutation of 
her name, and her exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit 
was found correct, it was held that she had acquired title by adverse 
possession, and the suit was dismissed with respect to the disputed 
chaw I. 
The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Some of the defendants 
also filed appeals in respect of the other items of property. All these 
appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment. 
The High Court reversed the finding of adverse possession in 
regard to the disputed chaw! and granted a decree for partition. It held 
that Defendant No. 6 remained in exclusive possession of the property 
only since 1952, the period was thus short of the time required for 
prescription of title. It further held that since the rents of the chaw! 
from 1952 were collected by her husband and after his death by her son 
(Defendant No. 7), she was liable to render accounts till the death of her 
husband, and she along with Defendant No. 7 would be jointly liable for 
the period thereafter. 
Separate Appeals were preferred by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 to 
this Court. 
Allowing the Appeals, setting aside the decision of the High Court 
and restoring that of the Trial Court. 
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234 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 
HELD: 1. The principle that revenue entry furnishes presump-
tive evidence of title is inapplicable in the instant case. It cannot be 
denied that title to Naroda Chawl could not have passed to Defendant 
No. 6 by virtue of the entry Ext. 247. The value of the chawl even in 
1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer w

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