SMT. ANNAPOORANI AMMAL versus G. THANGAPALAM

Citation: [1989] 2 S.C.R. 833 · Decided: 01-05-1989 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.L. OZA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

.l 
-
SMT. ANNAPOORANIAMMAL 
A 
v. 
G. THANGAPALAM 
MAY 1, 1989 
[G.L. OZA, AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ.) 
B 
Code of Civil Procedure 1908: Section JOO-High Court-
Jiurisdiction to interfere only when substantial question of law involved. 
Specific Relief Act, 1963: Section 5-Specific performance-Can 
be decreed only against executant of contract having right to dispose of C 
property. 
The appellant purchased the suit property by a registered sale 
deed dated 27th December, 1950 for a consideration of Rs. 7 ,000. On 1st 
January, 1951, the respondent executed a rent agreement in favour of 
the appellant acknowledging her as landlady at Rs.SO per month. 
D 
The mother of the appellant died in 1963. In 1974, the respondent 
filed a suit against the appellant for conveyance of the suit property in 
his favour on the basis of a 'yadast', alleged to have been written by the 
mother of the appellant on 24th December, 1950 in his favour providing 
for conveyance of the property In his favour after .paying the sale price 
.E 
of Rs.7,000 and Rs.1,000 for registration expenses. This 'yadast' was 
however neither stamped, registered, nor attested. It was marked as Ex. 
A-11. The Trial Court decreed the respondent's suit relying on the 
'yadast'. 
On appeal the Additional District Judge after detailed examina-
F 
lion of all the facts involved in the case and the evidence of the parties, 
came to the finding that the appellant acquired title to the property on 
the basis of the sale deed which was a registered document in her favour 
and that the suit property was leased out to the respondent under a rent 
agreement, and that as the mother of the appellant was not a party to 
the sale deed she had no right to agree'to convey the property or to ask G 
her daughter to convey the same in favour of the respondent. He also 
came to the conclusion that the Yadast was not a genuine document but 
a forged one which was just got up for the purposes of the suit. He 
accordingly allowed the appeal,' and held that the suit for specific 
performance was further barred as it was filed more than 20 years after 
the alleged 'Yadast'. 
H 
833 
A 
B 
c 
834 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 
The High Court in Second Appeal, however interfered with the 
_;._ 
findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court solely on thj> 
basis that the evidence of the scribe of the 'Yadast' was not discussed by 
the lower appellate Court, and accordingly allowed the Second Appeal. 
In the Special Leave Petition to this Court, it was contended on 
behalf of the appellant that the suit for specific performance of the 
contract could only b~ decreed against the executant of the contract 
provided the executant had a right to dispose of the property about4 
which the suit was filed, and that there was no question of law on the 
basis of which the High Court exercised jurisdiction under Section 100 
C.P.C. and interfered with the findings of fact. 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD: t. Section 100 C.P.C. clearly ;ndic&tes that the High 
Court had the jurisdiction to interfere only when a substantial question 
of law is involved and even then it is expected that such a question shall 
D 
be so framed although the court is not bound by that question as the 
proviso indicates. There may be some other substantial questions of law 
which may need decision and which can be so decided. [838.G-H] 
In the instant case, the Single Judge of the High Court has chosen 
to interfere with the findings of fact solely on the basis of one ground, 
E 
that the evidence of the scribe of the 'Yadast' PW 2 was not discussed 
by the lower appellate court, and its failure has affected the validity of 
the finding rendered by it. This was no substantial question of law, 
much less a question of law on which the High Court could interfere 
with the findings of fact. At best the questions on which the High Court 
chose to interfere could be said to be questions of appreciation of 
F 
evidence. [837H; 839F] 
x 
2. The suit for specific performance of the contract could only 
• 
be decreed against the executant of the contract provided the execu-
G 
tant had a right to dispose of the property about which the suit is 
filed. [836H; 837 A] 
In the instant case, admittedly the mother of the appellant who, 
was alleged to have executed the 'Yadast' was not the owner of the 
property. Both the parties to the 'Yadast' were strangers to the sale 
deed, and the sale deed does not re

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