SITU SAHU AND ORS. versus THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ORS.

Citation: [2004] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 258 · Decided: 10-09-2004 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
SITU SAHU AND ORS. 
v. 
THE STATE OF IBARKHAND AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 10, 2004 
B 
[SHIVARAJV. PATIL A!'m B.N. SRIKRISHNA, JJ.] 
Land Laws: 
Tenancy--Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908-Sections 71A & 46-
C Restoration of possession to Scheduled Tribe over land unlawfully transferred-
Power under S. 71 A-Exercise of-Held: Surrender of tenancy by members 
of Scheduled Tribes on 7-2-1938 ,followed by settlement of land in favour 
of Appellants on 25:2-1938 was in quick succession and could be considered 
as 'transfer' under the Act-But no provision of law existed in 1938 under 
which the transfer was prohibited-Even assuming the transfer as fraudulent, 
D power under S. 71A to restore possession could have been exercised only 
within reasonable time-Restoration of possession wa! sought in 1978 after 
an unreasonable long period of 40 years-Special Offecer who had allowed 
the application did not exercise his powers under S. 71 A within a reasonable 
period of time-Limitation Act, 1963-Article 65. 
E 
In the area to which the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 applied, 
certain lands were originally recorded in the names of 'K', 'B' and 'J', 
ancestors of one 'G'. They were the recorded tenants of land. 'J' died 
immediately after the revisional survey while 'K' and 'B' surrendered 
ten.ancy ad measuring 2.65 acres of land to the landlord by a registered 
F deed dated 7-2-1938. Soon thereafter, the landlord settled the land on 
the appellants on 25-2-1938. The appellants have been Jin possession of 
the land and cultivating it. 
On 3-2-1978 the said 'G' (fifth Respondent) flied an application 
under Section 71A of the Act for restoration of the land in question on 
G the ground that the appellants ·had fraudulently acquired the land by 
means of a 'sada hukumnama'. The Special Officer, Ranchi issued notices 
to the appellants and, after hearing the parties and recording evidence, 
came to the conclusion that the land belonged to the ancestors of 'G', 
who were members 'of Scheduled Tribes and khatiyani holders of the 
H land in question. Although, originally there wer~ four co-sharers in the 
258 
SITU SAHU v. ST A TE 
259 
land, namely, 'K', 'B', 'J' and 'G', the tenancies were surrendered only A 
by 'K' and 'B' and not by the other two. The Special Officer took the 
view that the surrender and the settlement of the land constituted one 
continuing act and was, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the Act. 
He also held that the surrender was illegal as all the shareholders had 
not surrendered their rights and decided that by reason of the provisions B 
of Section 71A of the Act the tribals could not have been dispossessed 
from the aforesaid land. Thus he allowed the application for restoration 
of possession to the applicant 'G'. The appellant appealed to the 
Additional Collector, Ranchi who affirmed the view of the Special Officer 
A revision petition was also dismissed by the Commissioner. 
The appellants challenged the order of the Revenue Authorities by 
filing a writ petition. The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding 
c 
that section 71A of the Act is a beneficial legislation and the legislative 
intent is to extend protection to a class of citizens who were unable to 
protect their properties on account of backwardness, and, therefore, the D 
Court had to give a broad and liberal construction to the legislative 
intent of protection. Hence the appeals. 
The appellants contended that there is no retrospective effect given 
to Section 71A so as to cover transactions which took place in the remote 
past and so the power to restore possession could not have been exercised E 
under section 71A; and that the period of limitation of 30 years was long 
past when the application for restoration of possession was sought to be 
entered by the Special Officer in the year 1978. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
F 
HELD: 1.1. The use of the words "at any time" in section 71A is 
evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy 
Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to 
prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward 
citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner choses to exercise his G 
power under Section 71A it would be futile to contend that the period 
of limitation under Limitation Act has expired. (266-F, G] 
1.2. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended 
to bar suits brought in civil courts where the part

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