SIRSILK LTD. AND ANOTHER versus TEXTILES COMMITTEE & ORS.
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A B c SIRSILK LTD. AND ANOTHER v. TEXTILES COMMITTEE & ORS. SEPTEMBER 12, 1988 [A.P. SEN AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] Textile Committee Act, 1963/Textile Committee Rules 1965: Sec- tions 2(g), 12(1) and 22/Rule 21'--Fe~lmposition of-On production of rayon yarn and staple fibre yarn-Constitutional validity of-Words used in statute to be interpreted in popular sense. Statutory Construction: Provision of earlier statute can be made use of for purpose of construing a subsequent statute in case of ambiquity. A number of textile mills which were engaged in the business of D manufacture and sale of rayon yarn and staple fibre, i.e. man-made fibre, moved the High Courts under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the fee imposed upon them by the Textile Committee under rule 21 of the Textile Committee Rules, 1965 made by the Central Government under s. 22 of the Textiles Committee Act, 1963. The levy of fee was challenged on the ground that E the Textile Committee was not rendering any service to them by way of inspection or examination of rayon yarn and that the element of quid pro quo was totally absent. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Madras upheld the validity of the levy, w bile the Kerala High Court F took the contrary view. The parties came up in appeal to this Court. Four similar petitions pending in the High Court of Bombay were also transferred to this Court. Before the Court, it was contended on behalf of the textile mills (I) the rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by them was made wholly G of filaments and not of fibres and therefore the same are not textiles within the meaning of the definition of •textiles' as contained of S. 2(g) of the Textile Committee Act, and hence not liable to payment of any fee in accordance with rule 21 of the Textile Committee Rules; and (2) the Textiles Committee rendered no service to the writ petitioners because neither they needed the services of the Committee nor the Committee H was in a position to render any service to them. 880 \ I SIRSILK LTD. v. 1EXTILES COMMITTEE 881 On behalf of the Revenue, the Additional Solicitor General con- tended (1) the levy under r. 21 of the Rules was not correlated to the power. of inspection which the Textiles Committee had und·er s. 11 of the Act, but was relatable to its power to levy fees under s. 12 for the performance of its functions, powers and duties under s. 4 (2) the avowed object and purpose of the Act, as was clear from s. 3, was 'quality control' of all textile and it would be idle to contend that rayon yarn and nylon yarn which were but species of what was known as man-made fibres, otherwise called artificial silk, and had a world market, should be outside the purview of the Act, (3) the Act and the words used therein had to be interpreted not on a technological or specialised scientific plane, but in a popular sense as understood by experts in the sphere of the textile industry and the commercial world dealing with it; and ( 4) the definition of 'textiles' must be given a broad C and liberal construction in furtherance of the object and purpose of the Act. A B Dismissing the appeals filed by the textile mills and allowing the appeal filed by the Textile Committee, it was D HELD: (1) In view of the fact that in the writ petitions filed in the High Courts the textile mills had stated that they were actually engaged in the manufacture of rayon. yarn and nylon yarn both of which, they a\'erred, were 'species of what was known as man-made fibres', their contention that rayon yarn and nylon yarn manufactured by them E were not 'yarn' and therefore did not fall within the definition of textiles under s. 2(g) of the Act could be countenanced. [899E-F) (2)- T!tere was no explicable reason for the Legislature to have excluded rayon yarn and nylon yarn frof!l the purview of the definition of textiles in s.(2)(g) of the Act. In the premise, the expression 'textiles' F as defined in s.2(g) of the Act has to be given a broad and liberal construction, in furtherance of the purpose and object of the Act. [901A-B) (3) The Act and the words used therein have to be interpreted not on a technological or specialised scientific plane but in the popular sense as understood by experts in the 5phere of the textile industry and the G commercial world dealing with it. ·[90ID-E) ( 4) The Industries (Development and Regul
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