SIRAJ AHMAD SIDDIQUI versus SHRI PREM NATH KAPOOR

Citation: [1993] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 254 · Decided: 13-09-1993 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. VERMA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
SIRAJ AHMAD SIDDIQUI 
v. 
SHRI PREM NATH KAPOOR 
SEPTEMBER 13, 1993 
[J.S. VERMA, M.M. PUNCHHI AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.J 
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 
1972: Section 20 (4}-Explanation-Expression-'First hearing'-Scope of 
C 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Order VIII, Rule I-Expression 'First 
Hearing'-Scope of 
The respondent-landlord filed a suit against the appellant-tenant for 
ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent. On 20th January 1984 the Trial 
D Court issued notice to the appellant directing him to file written statement 
by 22nd February 1984 and also fixed 28th Ferbruary 1984 for framing the 
issues. On 24th February 1984 the appellant made an application praying 
for grant of time for filing the written statement and depositing the rent 
stating that he had no knowledge of the suit before and had come to know 
of it on that very day. He also sought a copy of the plaint stating that he 
E had not been served with summons. The Trial Court cancelled the hearing 
fixed for 28th February 1984 and deferred until 24th March, 1984 the date 
for filing the written statement and until 12 April, 1984 the date for first 
hearing. On 25th F(\bruary, 1984 the appellant deposited the rent in the 
Court but on 2nd March, 1984 made another application stating that since 
p 
he had not received a copy of the plaint and had inspected the record of 
the case hurriedly, a mistake had occurred so that some part of the arrears 
had not been deposited. Accordingly he prayed for further time to deposit 
the same. The respondent opposed the application contending that under 
Section 20( 4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and 
Eviction) Act, 1972, the entire amount of arrears had to be deposited on 
G or before the first hearing and the court had no power to extend the time 
but appellant's application was allowed without prejudice to the 
respondent's objection. On 5th March, 1984 the appellant deposited the 
balance amount of arrears. However, after hearing the argument, the Trial 
Court held that he appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) 
H and decreed the respondent's suit. The revision application filed by the 
254 
S.A. SIDDIQUI v. P.N. KAPOOR 
255 
appellant dismissed. 
In appeal to this court, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf 
of the respondent-landlord that this Court should not exercise its discre-
tion under Article 136 in favour of the appellant-tenant because he had not 
approached the Court with clean hands inasmuch as in his type-written 
application dated 24th February he had not mentioned that he had not 
received a copy of the plaint but had subsequently made interpolations in 
this regard by hand for securing the benefit of Section 20(4). On merits it 
was contended that for the purpose of Section 20(4) the expression 'first 
hearing' meant the first date for any step or proceedings mentioned in the 
summons served on the defendant. 
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that by its order dated 
24th February 1984 the Trial Court had not only cancelled the hearing 
fixed for 28th February, 1984 but also had deferred until 24th March, 1984 
the date for filing the written statement and until 12th April, 1984 the date 
A 
B 
c 
for the first hearing; and since he deposited the entire amount of the D 
arrears on 5th March, 1984 he was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4). 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1. The appeal cannot be dismissed only upon the ground 
that the appellant had not approached the court with clean hands for, 
basically, two reason. In the type-written application it is mentioned that 
the summons had not been served on the appellant and that he had not 
refused to accept it. What was added by hand was that a copy of the plaint 
relative to the summons had not been supplied. There was, therefore, only 
an amplification in hand-writing of the averments already made in the 
type-written application. Secondly, each hand-written addition on the ap-
plication was flanked on either side by the initials of the advocate for the 
appellant. [258-A-C] 
E 
F 
2. The date of the first hearing cannot, plainly, be the date of service 
of the summons. That is plain from the expression "first hearing" itself and G 
from the meaning given to it in the Act. [260-F] 
3. The "steps or proceedings mentioned in the summons" referred to 
in the definition should be construed to be a step or proceedin

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