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SHYAM SUNDER DUTTA versus BAIKUNTHA NATH BANERJEE (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.

Citation: [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 741 · Decided: 21-09-1994 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, N. VENKATACHALA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

-
SHYAM SUNDER DUTTA 
A 
v . 
. BAIKUNTHA NATH BANERJEE (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. 
SEPTEMBER 21, 1994 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] 
B 
Tenancy Laws: 
Bengal Tenancy Act. 
Suit for partition-Appointment of Receiver-Tenants inducted by C 
him-Receiver was discharged after the suit was decreed-Whether tenants 
inducted by him acquired tenancy rights pursuant to the tenancy created by 
him by adverse possessio7t-Held no-Finding of fact-lnteiference by High 
Court without considering the entire evidence-Held not justified. 
The 'appellant's mother filed a suit for partition of certain proper-
ties. A Receiver was appointed· in 1933. He induc~ed the Respondents as 
tenants therein. The suit was decreed in 1940 and the Receiver was dis· 
charged in 1941. 
D 
On attaining majority, the appellant filed a second partition suit for E 
partition of other properties and also the suit property which was jointly 
in possession and enjoyment of the appellant and his co-sharers. He also 
filed an application for ad-interim injunction to restrain the respondents 
from interfering with his possession. The .suit was decreed. 
Thereafter a third suit was filed by the appellant when there was 
F 
threat of dispossession to an extent of 2 acres and 21 cents, praying for a 
declaration that the said lands together with the gardtn and, fruit bearing 
trees belong to the appellant and his co-sharers and the respondents had 
no tenancy rights created by the Receiver and for perpetual injunction 
restraining them from interfering with their possession. The Trial Court G 
dismissed the suit. The appellate Court decreed the suit. On appeal, the 
High Court reversed the order of the appellate Court. 
In this appeal, the question that arose was whether the respondents 
acquired any tenancy rights pursuant to the tenancy· created by the 
Receiver by adverse possession. 
H 
741 
742 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A 
Allowing the appeal, this Court 
B 
c 
D 
HELD : 1. It is settled law that a Receiver when appointed to manage 
the suit property, acts as an officer of the Court. Unless the Court grants 
permission to induct any third party into possession as a tenant in 
accordance with the directions contained in the Order or as per the law 
then prevailing, the person inducted by the Receiver into possession would 
remain only as a licensee under the Receiver. As soon as the Receiver is 
discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain 
in possession during the period when the receiver was in management of 
the suit property, it comes to an end. On the discharge of the Rece_iver, the 
licensee has no ·right to remain in possession as either a tenant or a 
licensee. Therefore, the period of his possession cannot be treated or 
tagged for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. (745-B, CJ 
P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, (1957) SCR 195, relied· on. 
2. In the instant case, the question of the respondents to have 
remained in possession, could not have been gone into by the High Court, 
since the District Court on consideration of the entire evidenc;e had 
categorically recorded a finding of fact that the appellant and his co-:. 
sharers ·remained in possession from August 1945 and that 
1the respon-
E 
dents were not continuing in possession from that time. This being a 
finding of fact, the High Court would not have gone into the question. The 
High Court has gone into the question whether. the respondents were not 
dispossessed from suit lands and recorded a finding that they remained 
in possession. That finding does not appear to be warranted in view of the 
F 
fact that the evidence was not discussed and the only evidence the High 
Court had considered was that of PW-1 but the first appellate court had 
considered the evidence of PWs 2 to 5 and the documentary evidence and 
that evidence was found to be in support of the evidence given by PW-1 
that the respondents did not continue in possession from August, 1945. 
Therefore, the finding recorded by the High Court, in fact, was not nec~s-
G sary. Even otherwise, that finding was recorded without adverting to all 
the material evidence and that, therefore, the finding of possession 
recorded by the High Court is clearly illegal. (745-E to H, 746-A] 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3190 of 
H 1988. 
S.S. DU1TA v. B.N. BANERJEE 
743 
From the Judgment and Order dated 10 & 16.8.84 of the Calcutta A 
High Court in Appeal from 

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