SHYAM KISHORE AND ORS. versus MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR.

Citation: [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 349 · Decided: 03-09-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. RANGANATHAN · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

SHY AM KlSHORE AND ORS. 
v. 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI AND ANR. 
SEPTEMB.ER 3, 1992 
[S. RANGANATHAN, V. RAMASWAMI AND 
YOGESHWAR DAYAL, JJ.] 
Delhi Municipal Corporation Ac4 1957: 
A 
B 
Section 170(b )-Constitutio11al validity of-Appeal against enhance-
C 
ment of rateable value of property-Condition of pre-deposit of tax before 
filing of the appeal-Whether unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution-Words 'no appeal should be heard.or determined under Section 
169 unless'-lnterpretation of-Clause (b) only bars the hearing of appeal and 
its disposal on merits, but not entertainment of the appeal itse/f-;4.mendment 
of provision-Suggested. 
D 
Constitution of India, 1950: 
Article 14---Right of appeal granted by statute-Imposition of conditions 
for exercise pf such right-Whether valid. 
Articles 226 and 227-When alternative remedy available under 
provisions of Statute-Recourse to Court by way of Writ Petition-Whether 
proper. 
E 
Interpretation of Statutes-Words of a provision-Wider construction to 
~~ 
F 
The appellants filed an appeal under Section 169 of the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 before the Disirict Judge challenging the 
enhancement of the rateable value of the property ia dispute. The District 
Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-deposit of the disputed G 
tax. The appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court against the 
District Judge's order. 
The appeal was heard by a Full Bench of the High Court. All the 
three Judges were agreed that the condition of deposit of tax amount 
under Section 170 (b) of the Act was a condition precedent for hearing or H 
349 
350 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 
A determination of the appeal and the District Judge had no discretion to 
grant stay or the disputed amount or dispense with the requirement of 
pre-deposit of the amount in appeal, with or without conditions, in the 
office of the Corporation. They were also agreed as to the amount to be 
deposited. However, while two of the Judges held that Section 170(b) was 
B not ultra vires of the Constitution and that the right of appeal was a 
creature of the statute and there was nothing wrong in the statute making 
a provision for conditional appeal requiring that a person desirous of 
filing an appeal was to comply with the condition and affirmed the District 
Judge's Order, the third Judge held that the sub-section was violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution and struck it down, and directed the appel· 
C late authority to entertain the appeal without deposit of the amount and 
decide it on merits. 
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellants-asses· 
sees, it was contended that the answer to the issue of constitutional 
D validity of Section 170(b) would considerably depend upon the interpreta· 
lion that was placed on the scope of the powers of the appellate authority, 
that If the provision was interpreted as mandating that an appeal could 
not be entertained but would have to be dismissed in limine if the tax in 
dispute was not paid along with the memorandum of appeal, that would 
place a very onerous condition on the right of appeal, particularly in cases 
E 
where there was a substantial amount involved in the appeal and the 
points raised were really contentions and debatable; that once the assess· 
ment list was amended after hearing the assessee, it might stand adopted 
for several subsequent years and demands for all these years would have 
to be met until the assessment for the first year was altered in appeal, that 
F 
the right of appeal itself would become illusory, if subjected to such a rigid 
and absolute condition, and the provision would, therefore, be invalid, as 
Imposing an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the 
appellant·assessee, that curbing of unlimited appeal given by Section 
169(1) of the Act was arbitrary and unreasonable and hit by Article 14 of 
the Constitution, that the opening part of Section 170 that 'no appeal shall 
G be beard or determined under Section 169 unless' barred, merely the final 
determination or hearing of the appeal and not any other stage of the 
hearing of appeal including the prelimiary/admission stage of the appeal. 
It was contended on behalf of the respondent-Corporation that the 
H validity of similar provisions had been unheld earlier, that even though an 
SHYAM KISHORE v. M.C.D. 
351 
appeal, In such cases, might have to be thrown out, the assesse

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