SHRI TULSI versus SMT. PARO (DEAD)

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 535 · Decided: 06-11-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

SHRI TULSI 
A 
v. 
SMT. PARO (DEAD) 
NOVEMBER 6, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] 
B 
Transfer of Property Act, I 882 : 
Lease-Agriculture land-Suit for possession by landowner claiming 
that the defendant was a licensee-Defendant-Appellant claiming himself C 
to be a tenant at will and Revenue records showing him as such-Held, 
when the name of the appellant has successively found place in revenue 
records from 1951-52 to 1971-72, as 'tenant al will' and he remained in 
uninterupted possession and elijoyment of the property for over 20 years, 
he cannot be said to be only a licensee: he is tenant at will liable to 
eviction according to law. 
'Lease' and 'licence'-Dif.ference between-Explained. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2585 of 
1980. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.6.80 of the Himachal Pradesh 
High Court at Simla in R.S.A. No. 138 of 1979. 
A.P. Mohanty for S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellant. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
' 
D 
E 
F 
This appea! by special leave arises from the )udgment of the learned 
Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, dated June 16, 1980 in 
RSA No. 138/79. The trial Court had decreed the suit and appellate Court G 
allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. In the second appeal, the High 
Court reversed the judgment and decree of the appellate Court and 
. confirmed that of trial Court. Thus, this appeal. 
The admitted facts are that the suit properties of various Khasra nos. 
admeasuring 12.4 bighas and 22.4 bighas situated in Mahal Kanyarka H 
535 
536 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 
A Pargana Churah Tehsil Bhattiyat District Chamba in the State of Himachal 
Pradesh, belonged to the respondent. She had filed a suit for possession 
against the appellant pleading that he is a licensee and had agreed to cultivate 
the lands on her behalf as licensee and, therefore, he is liable to be ejected 
by a decree of eviction in the suit. It is the case of the appellant that 
though the parties are related, he is only a tenant at will and he agreed to 
B cultivate the land as a tenant giving the produce to the respondent-landlady 
as he was looking after her. The admitted position is that the Revenue 
records for the period from 1951-52 to 1971-72 do indicate that the 
appellant had been shown as 'Gar Marusi'. It would appear that it means 
"tenant at will". Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines lease 
thus: "A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such 
C property made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in 
consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a store of crops, 
service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on 
specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the 
transfer on such terms". It is not necessary that lease should always be 
D reduced to writing. What is necessary is for transfer of a right of enjoyment 
of the property made for a certain time, expressed or implied and for 
consideration of the price, paid or promised, the transferee must have 
been put in possession of the demised property, it is also neces.sary that an 
agreement can be entered into for rendering periodical service and for 
consideration thereof and on transfer of the land to the transferee and 
E acceptance thereof, either orally or in writing, the lease comes into existence. 
It is seen that when the name of the appellant has successively found place 
in the records for period from 1951-52 to 1971-72 as "tenant at will", the 
necessary conclusion is that he is tenant at will liable to eviction according 
to law. The theory that he is a licensee, as has been accepted by the High 
F Court and the Trial Court, is untenable. A licensee has no right in the 
property, not to speak ofany right to the exclusive possession of the property 
and animus of possession always remains with the licensor; the licensee 
gets the possession only with the consent of the licensee and is liable to 
vacate when so asked. In this case, since the appellant remained in 
uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the property for over 20 years, 
G it is unthinkable to conclude that they are only licensee. The High Court 
and the trial Court, therefore, were clearly in error in reaching the conclusion 
that the appellant b only a licensee. On the other hand, from the facts, it is 
clear that the appellant is a tenant and he will be liable for e

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