SHRI MAHABIR PRASAD JAIN versus SHRI GANGA SINGH

Citation: [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 415 · Decided: 05-10-1999 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. SRINIVASAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

_., 
-~ 
SHRI MAHABIR PRASAD JAIN 
A 
v. 
SHRI GANGA SINGH 
OCTOBER 5, 1999 
[M. SRINIVASAN, AP. MISRA AND N. SANTOSH HEGDE, JJ.) 
B 
Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section 6. 
Suit-Decree for possession of tenanted premises-Grant of-Trial 
Coun through finding that respondent's tenancy not proved, granting decree 
C 
for possession without considen·ng evidence on record-On revision, High 
Cou/1 without examining the status of respondent as tenant, confirming the 
decree of Trial Coun-Validity of-Held, Trial Coun committed serious e"or 
by granting decree for possession on e"oneous presumption without consider-
ing the evidence on record-High Cou11 failed in its duty by confirming such 
a decree without e,xamining the case in proper perspective-Civil Procedure 
Code, 1908-S.115. 
Suit-Decree for possession of tenanted premises-Grant of-No prayer 
in the plaint regarding removal of any illegal construction-However, Tn'al 
Coun directing appellant to remove the construction put up by him on the 
suit premises-Validity of-Held, such a relief cannot be granted as it travels 
beyond the scope of prayer in the plaint-High Cou/1 e"ed in confirming such 
a relief 
Limitation-Suit for possession of tenanted premises-Decree by Trial 
Coun-Revision petition-Only plea raised that the suit was bamd by limita-
tion-Revision petition dismissed by High Court-Validity of-Held, even for 
the purpose of considering the plea of limitation it is absolutely necessary to 
consider whether respondent is in exclusive possession of the tenanted 
premises-High Court not justified in dismissing the Revision Petition. 
Municipalities-{]nauthon·sed construction-Compounding fe~eld, 
compounding fee can be calculated only on the basis of the area of un-
authorised construction that is completed. 
Respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction, against appellant 
D 
E 
F 
G 
and the Municipal Corporation for restraining them from dispossessing H 
415 
416 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
-
A him from the tuckshop. Trial Court granted an ad interim injunction. 
Respondent's application for restoration of electricity supply to the said 
tuckshop was allowed by Additional Rent Contr9ller without going into 
.. 
the merits of the case. Thereafter, respondent filed a second suit under 
S.6 of Specific Relief Act claiming decree for possession of the premises, 
B 
on the ground that he was a tenant under the predecessor-in-interest of 
appellant and subsequently on purchase of suit property by appellant, a 
tenant under him. Trial Court while holding that respondent was not 
inducted as a tenant by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, 
decreed the suit in favour of respondent holding that he was dispossessed 
-
from the suit premises by the appellant. The Trial Court also directed 
c the appellant to remove the constructions put up by him on the said 
premises. On revision, High Court dismissed the revision petition holding 
that the only plea that the suit was barred by limitation was not sus-
tainable. Hence the present appeal. 
D 
On behalf of appellant, it was contended that once the basis of the 
claim made by the respondent that he came into possession of the proper-
ty as a tenant of the appellant's predecessor-in-title has been found 
against, the court ought to have realized that the respondent could never 
have been the tenant on the property and consequently he could not have 
been in possession of the same as such; that the dispossession of the 
E respondent as servant or agent of appellant was completed in 1984 and 
the suit having been filed in 1986 was clearly barred by limitation; that 
there is no explanation on the part of the respondent for filing the second 
suit for possession when he had earlier filed a suit for injunction and the 
material discrepancies between the averments in the plaint in the first 
F 
suit and the plaint in the second suit have been completely overlooked 
and ignored by the courts below. 
Allowing the appeals, the Court 
Held : 1.1. Trial Court committed serious error by not considering 
G the material evidence on record while granting a decree of specific relief. 
High Court in revision failed in its duty when it confirmed the judgment 
of the trial Court by entirely overlooking the aspect whether respondent 
was a tenant of appellant as claimed. [ 418-F; G; HJ 
1.2. Trial Court having found expressly against the case of tenancy 
~
H put forward by the respondent ought to have considered whet

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.