SHRI H.D. SHARMA versus NORTHERN INDIA TEXTILE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

Citation: [2018] 14 S.C.R. 476 · Decided: 03-12-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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476                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2018] 14 S.C.R.
SHRI H.D. SHARMA
v.
NORTHERN INDIA TEXTILE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
(Civil Appeal No. 3168 of  2010)
DECEMBER 03, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: ss.2(y), 6E(2)
and its proviso – Respondent-employer moved an application under
s.6E(2) seeking approval of dismissal of appellant-workman on
charges of misconduct – Appellant-workman opposed the same on
the ground that there was short payment of Rs.110/- as he was paid
only Rs.1103/- whereas his monthly wages was 1214/- and, therefore,
the respondent did not ensure full compliance with the condition
which was necessary for grant of approval to the dismissal order in
terms of proviso to sub-section (2) of s.6E of the Act – Held: The
records showed that the respondent had paid Rs.110/- to the
appellant in August 1986 by way of “interim relief” as an ex gratia
payment – The said sum of Rs.110/- was paid only once in August
1986 and not thereafter – Such payment cannot be termed either as
wages or its component within the meaning of s.2(y) r/w s.6E(2) of
the Act since any isolated one-time ex gratia payment made by way
of an interim relief neither satisfies the requirement of s.2(y) nor it
satisfies the requirement of clauses (i) to (iii) of s.2(y) of the Act – In
order to treat any payment as “wages”, it must be proved that it was
being paid by the employer to his employee pursuant to the terms of
his employment – It is only then a right is created in employee’s
favour to claim such amount from the employer – Appellant failed
to adduce any evidence to prove that Rs.110/- was being paid to
him every month by the respondent as a part of his term of the
employment – High Court failed to examine the main question as to
whether a payment of Rs.110/- was in the nature of “wages” or its
component within the meaning of s.2(y) of the Act –  Without deciding
this question, the High Court held that such amount could be
adjusted against the payment made by the employer (respondent)
to the appellant under “leave encashment” – It was not correct
approach – Respondent’s application made under s.6E(2) of the
Act is allowed by granting approval to the appellant’s dismissal –
Labour law.
[2018] 14 S.C.R. 476
476
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477
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. Section 2(y) defines the term ‘wages’ whereas
Section 6E provides that condition of service of a workman has
to remain unchanged in certain circumstances. Proviso to Section
6E(2) says that no workman can be discharged or dismissed from
the services unless he has been paid wages for one month and an
application is made by an employee to an authority before whom
the proceedings are pending for approval of the action taken by
the employer against the workman. The appellant has relied on
the break up of his monthly wages.  It is this amount which,
according to the appellant, should have been paid to him by the
respondent as a pre-condition to give effect to his dismissal order.
So far as the respondent is concerned, they relied on the details
of the appellant’s monthly wages payable/paid to him at the time
of his dismissal in full and final satisfaction. The word “wages”
defined in Section 2(y) of the Act is in peri materia with the
definition of word “wages” defined in Section 2(rr) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. [Paras 24-26, 29][484-D-F; 485-A-B, G-H]
Bharat Electronics Limited v. Industrial Tribunal,
Karnataka, Bangalore & Anr. (1990) 2 SCC 314 :
[1990] 1 SCR 971 ;  Syndicate Bank Limited v.
Ramanath (1968) 1 SCR 327 – relied on
2.1 It came in evidence that the respondent had paid
Rs.110/- to the appellant in August 1986 by way of “interim relief”
as an ex gratia payment. It is not in dispute that a sum of
Rs.110/- was paid only once in August 1986 and not thereafter.
Such payment cannot be termed either as  wages or its component
within the meaning of Section 2 (y) read with Section 6E (2) of the
Act. The reason is that any isolated one time ex gratia payment
made by way of an interim relief neither satisfies the requirement
of Section 2 (y) and nor it satisfies the requirement of clauses (i)
to (iii) of Section 2 (y) of the Act.  If such amount had been paid
regularly by the respondent to the appellant in compliance with
his terms of employment, it would have been regarded as wages
or its component within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the Act.
In order that any payment is r

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