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SHRI GURUDATTA SUGARS MARKETING PVT. LTD. versus PRITHVIRAJ SAYAJIRAO DESHMUKH & ORS.

Citation: [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1211 · Decided: 24-07-2024 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: VIKRAM NATH · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1211 : 2024 INSC 551
Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. 
v. 
Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 3070-3071 of 2024)
24 July 2024
[Vikram Nath* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the signatory of the cheque, authorized by the “Company”, 
is the “drawer” and whether such signatory could be directed to pay 
interim compensation in terms of section 143-A of the Negotiable 
Instruments Act, 1881 leaving aside the company. The High Court 
answered the question in the negative.
Headnotes†
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 141, 143-A – 
Appellant company entered into several agreements with C 
Ltd. and made advance payments for supply of sugar – C 
failed to supply – In order to discharge the liability, two 
cheques were issued by respondent nos.1 to 3 (directors of C) 
in favour of the appellant and the same were dishonoured 
due to insufficiency of funds  – Appellant issued notice – 
Again payments were not made – Appellant preferred a 
complaint before the Judicial Magistrate – In the meantime, 
C was admitted into CIRP – Appellant filed an application 
u/s. 143-A, NI Act against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 seeking 
interim compensation – Judicial Magistrate directed each of 
the respondents to pay 4% of the total cheque amount as 
interim compensation – The said order was challenged by the 
respondent nos.1 to 3 before the High Court – The High Court 
allowed the application preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 
to 3 herein and set aside the order of interim compensation 
passed by the Judicial Magistrate – Correctness:
Held: The High Court’s interpretation of Section 7 of the NI Act 
accurately identified the “drawer” as the individual who issues the 
cheque – This interpretation is fundamental to understanding the 
obligations and liabilities u/s. 138 of the NI Act, which makes it 
* Author
1212
[2024] 7 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
clear that the drawer must ensure sufficient funds in their account 
at the time the cheque is presented – The appellants’ argument 
that directors or other individuals should also be liable u/s. 143-A 
misinterprets the statutory language and intent – The general rule 
against vicarious liability in criminal law underscores that individuals 
are not typically held criminally liable for acts committed by others 
unless specific statutory provisions extend such liability – Section 
141 of the NI Act is one such provision, extending liability to the 
company’s officers for the dishonour of a cheque – The appellants’ 
attempt to extend this principle to Section 143-A, to hold directors 
or other individuals personally liable for interim compensation, is 
unfounded – The High Court rightly emphasized that liability u/s. 141 
arises from the conduct or omission of the individual involved, not 
merely their position within the company – The distinction between 
legal entities and individuals acting as authorized signatories is 
crucial – Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company 
but do not assume the company’s legal identity – This principle, 
fundamental to corporate law, ensures that while authorized 
signatories can bind the company through their actions, they do not 
merge their legal status with that of the company – This distinction 
supports the High Court’s interpretation that the drawer u/s. 143-A 
refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized 
signatories – The High Court’s decision to interpret ‘drawer’ strictly 
as the issuer of the cheque, excluding authorized signatories, 
is well-founded – This interpretation aligns with the legislative 
intent, established legal precedents, and principles of statutory 
interpretation – The primary liability for an offence u/s. 138 lies 
with the company, and the company’s management is vicariously 
liable only under specific conditions provided in Section 141 – The 
appellants’ submissions are thus rejected, and the High Court’s 
judgment is upheld – Thus, the question of law put before this 
Court is answered in negative. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 35]
Case Law Cited
Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. [2012] 5 
SCR 503 : (2012) 5 SCC 661 – held inapplicable.
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253; 
Central Bank of India v. Ravindra [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 323 : 
(2002) 1 SCC 367; Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha [2022] 6 
SCR 860 : (2022) 9 SCC 23; N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas 
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 
1213
Shri

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