SHRI CHANDRAGAUDA RAMGONDA PATIL AND ANR.
A
v.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS ETC.
SEPTEMBER 2, 1996
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]
B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
Land acquired for a public pwpose-Subsequently allotted for some
other public purpose--Claim for restitution of the land to the erstwhile C
owners-Held, not justified since the land could be used for a public purpose
other than the public purpose for which it was acquired and that the erstwhile
owner was paid adequate compensation according to the market value as on
the date of the Notification.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C) D
No. 16573 of 1996 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.96 of the Bombay High
Court in W.P. No. 1552 of 1996.
Bimrao N. Naik and AM. Khanwilhr for the Petitioner.
The following Order of the Court was delivered :
E
These Special Leave Petitions have been filed against the orders
passed in W.P. No. 5196/89 on March 12, 1990 and W.P. No. 1552/96 on
April 26, 1996. There is absolutely no merit for condonation of delay in the F
first writ petition. As regards the second writ petition, the facts are not in
dispute. Way back in 1974, notification, under Section 126(4) of the
Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act ("MRTP Act", for short) was
issued after the approval of the Scheme by the State Government, for
acquiring the land for utilisation thereof for the stated Scheme. Pursuant G
·thereto, an award came to be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under
Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the "Act") on
November 11, 1977. Possession was taken earlier on October 21, 1974.
After the utilisation of the land, surplus land was sought to be used for
allotment to some of the Councilors and the employees of the Kolhapur
Municipality. Consequently, the first writ petition came to be filed which H
445
446
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A was dismissed on merits on March 12, 1990. Thereafter, the petitioners
filed a suit challenging the acquisition and suit came to be dismissed as
withdrawn being not maintainable. Writ Petition No. 1552/96 came to be
filed. That writ petition was also dismissed on the ground that the earlier
order in the writ petition operated as res judicata. Therefore, the second
B writ petition was held to be not maintainable.
Shri Naik, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners,
contended that in the second writ petition, the petitioner sought restitution
of the possession pursuant to the Resolution of State Government dated
October 10, 1973 under which Government directed that the surplus land
C was to be utilised first for any other public purpose and in the alternative
it was to be given back to the erstwhile ·owners. Since he had sought
enforcement of the said Government Resolution, the writ petition could
not be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. He also seeks
to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in
conformity with enforcement of the Government Resolution. We do not
D think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution
of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and
vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not con-
cerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It
E
F
is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised
for any another public purpose, though use of it was intended for the
original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remain
unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate
compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the
notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified
in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.
The special leave petitions are dismissed.
G.N.
Petitions dismissed.
Lex