SHREE RAM URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS SHREE RAM MILLS LTD. versus THE COURT RECEIVER, HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A B [2014] 7 S.C.R. 446 . SHREE RAM URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS SHREE RAM MILLS LTD.) β’ v. THE COURT RECEIVER, HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (Civil Appeal No.5528 of 2014) MAY 9, 2014 [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.] C Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XL, r.1(d) - Administering property - Court Receiver - Rights/authority of - Suit filed on original side of High Court "in respect of immovable tenanted property - Respondent appointed as Court Receiver - Notice issued to appellant to pay D compensation and to vacate the suit premises - Appellant challenged right and power of respondent to determine the tenancy - Respondent instituted eviction suit against appellant before the Court of Small Causes - Whether respondent did not obtain leave of the court in filing the E eviction suit and without such leave, the eviction suit was liable to be dismissed - Held: Receiver is given full powers under Order XL Rule 1(d)- On facts, the Receiver acted in the matter as ought to have been done by the trustees to preserve theΒ· estate - It cannot be said that the Receiver without leave of F the court, could not have filed a suit - When authority has been given to the Receiver to preserve the estate, it empowers the Receiver, i.e., for preserving the estate, he has a right to institute suit and, accordingly, in the present case, the~ Receiver had the authority to institute a suit for preserving the estate - Plea that the suit was bad since the owners were the G trustees and were not made parties to the suit, not tenable - The Court Receiver holds the properties as custodia legis and on facts, respondent-Court Receiver acted as a reasonable prudent trustee for preservation of the property in question. H 446 SHREE RAM URBAN INFRAS. LTD. v. COURT RECEIVER, 44 7 HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - s. 106 - Termination of A tenancy - Notice - Suit filed on original side of High Court in respect of immovable tenanted property - Respondent 1appointed as Court Receiver - Notice issued to appellant to pay compensation and to vacate the suit premises - Validity of the notice - Effect of amendment of s.106(3) - Held: 8 Legislature plugged the loopholes and redressed the mischief by making a change in the law - On facts, eviction suit was filed against the appellant after six months from date of the notice issued uls. 106 TPA, by respondent-Court Receiver and therefore, the notice was not invalid - Code of Civil Procedure, C 1908 - Order XL, r.1(d). In a suit filed on the original side of the Bombay High Court in respect of an immovable tenanted property, the respondent was appointed as a Court Receiver to take charge of the property. The respondent issued Notice D dated July 26, 2001 to the appellant to pay compensation at the rate of RS.1,75,000/- per month from 1.4.2000 and to vacate the suit premises. The appellant replied stating that the respondent was appointed to control the suit premises and had no right and power to determine the E tenancy of the appellant. Meanwhile, the appellant was declared as a sick company under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The respondent instituted eviction suit against the F appellant before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay which was decreed. The order was upheld by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. The appellant, therefore, filed revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 CPC which was dismissed. Hence the present appeal. G The appellant challenged the High Court order on various grounds, firstly, that the Court Receiver did not obtain leave of the court in filing the suit and without such H 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 7 S.C.R. A leave, the eviction suit was liable to be ~.ismissed; secondly, that the notice was issued on July 26, 2001 asking the appellant to vacate the suit premises immediately, therefore, the notice was defective in view of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of 8 Property Act, and consequently the suit was liable to be dismissed; and thirdly, that the suit was also bad since the owners were the trustees and were not made parties to the suit. c Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. This Court cannot give a narrower construction with regard to the rights/authority given to the Receiver under Order XL Rule 1 (d); CPC. In the present case, the Receiver was given full
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex