SHIVKISHAN versus SUJATA TARACHAND MAKHIJA AND ORS.

Citation: [2019] 12 S.C.R. 796 · Decided: 27-09-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: UDAY UMESH LALIT · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
SHIVKISHAN
v.
SUJATA TARACHAND MAKHIJA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos.7652-7653 of 2019)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2019
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 –s.91 – First
Respondent (the disputant), an employee of Life Insurance
Corporation of India (LIC) opted for Plot No.2 in the Cooperative
Housing Society, meant principally for such employees– Allegedly,
in terms of seniority, she was entitled to be allotted the said Plot,
however it was illegally allotted to the appellant – Interim order
passed by the Cooperative Court injuncting the Society from
making any allotment in respect of Plot No.2– Despite the order,
registered sale deed executed by the Society in favour of the
appellant – Plea of the Society that it was the husband of the
disputant who was the original depositor and that she had attended
the meeting dtd. 18.12.88 not in her own capacity but as
representative of her husband – Cooperative Court inter alia found
that the the disputant could not claim to be the Member/deemed
Member of the Society and thus, was not entitled to any relief,
however, her husband was entitled to get sale deed executed after
getting all the formalities completed – Cooperative Appellate Court
held that the Disputant was senior Member of the Society as against
the appellant and was entitled to Plot No.2 opted by her – High
Court affirming the findings of the Appellate Court inter alia held
that the allotment of plot in favour of the appellant was illegal and
directed the Society to follow the procedure in accordance with law
for allotment of the plot – Held: In view of the fact that the
Disputant was an employee of LIC and had admittedly deposited
Rs.4,750/-, her status was clearly that of Depositor –Thus, in the
face of such admission and the findings rendered by the Courts
below, the Disputant was a Depositor of the Society and like all
other Depositors was entitled to and had attended the meeting dtd.
18.12.88 in her own right – At no stage the husband of the
Disputant claimed that he was the Depositor in his own right and
entitled to allotment of any Plot – Money deposited by all the
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   [2019] 12 S.C.R. 796
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Depositors including the Disputant helped the Society to have the
requisite land whereafter the Plots could be carved and allotted
to the concerned members – On the other hand, at no stage the
Appellant made any such contribution – He was neither present
in the meeting dtd.18.12.88 nor had he submitted any application
along with requisite fees – Disputant opted for Plot No.2 and as
on that date there was nobody else apart from the Disputant who
opted for the said plot – These aspects of the matter be taken into
account by the authorities while acting in terms of the direction
issued by the High Court and the allotment be restricted to those
who exercised their option as on 18.12.88 and were not otherwise
allotted any plot and had not accepted such allotment.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the face of the admitted position that she
had deposited Rs.4750/- and the findings rendered by the Courts
below, it has to be concluded that the Disputant was a Depositor
of the Society and like all other Depositors was entitled to and
had attended the meeting dated 18.12.1988 in her own right. At
no stage the husband of the Disputant claimed that he was the
Depositor in his own right and entitled to allotment of any Plot.
Further, it is not the case of the Disputant and her husband that
over and above the entitlement of the Disputant, her husband
is also entitled to an additional Plot. The submission was always
that there was only one entitlement, in exercise of which the
option was given for Plot No.2. If between the husband and wife,
the claim has always been only with respect to one entitlement,
it really made no difference whether the Disputant attended the
relevant meeting in her own right or as a representative of her
husband.  The fact of the matter is, an option was exercised in
favour of Plot No.2 and the issue is whether such option ought
to have been allowed and accepted or not. The communications
addressed by the Society were, normally in printed format where
the name of the addressee would be written after the printed
prefixes “Mr./Mrs.” and many such communications were
addressed to “Mr./Mrs. Makhija”. The record also shows that
some meetings were attended by the Disputant while some were
atten

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