SHIVA GLASS WORKS CO. LTD. versus ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND OTHERS.
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- SHIVA GLASS WORKS CO. LTD. v. ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND OTHERS. JANUARY 11, 1991 [N.D. OJHA AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.] Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944/Central Excise Rules, 1944: Section 3/Rules JO and JOA-Assessee-Price list of goods furnished- Accepted provisionally-Excise duty paid-Goods cleared-Discre- ~--'.," pancy-Detected late:-Recovery of excise duty-Whether permissible. The appellant company a licensee under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and during the relevant period namely 1st September, 1961 to 26th September, 1963 carried on the business of manufacturing different types of glasswares which were excisable goods under the Act. The appellant used to present A.R.I. forms accompanied with price lists of the goods and after paying excise duties calculated on the basis of the price lists used to remove the goods. The office of the appellant was searched by the Excise Authorities on 26th September, 1963 and several documents, books and papers were seized, and as a consequence thereof it transpired that the appellants were maintaining two sets of bills. The bills of one set were those on the basis of which the appellant used to pay excise duty befQre clearance of the goods and those of the other were such which were never issued to the dealers. In these two sets of bills, the rate of discount was differently shown. A notice dated 26th March, 1968 was served on the appellant by A B c D E the Assistant Collector stating that it appeared that during the relevant F period the appellant had n~t paid excise duty. on the goods at the prices at which they were sยทold, but duty was paid at lower rates and requiring it to show cause as to why duty on the prices at which the goods were actually sold, as found on scrutiny of sale vouchers/sale documents should not be recovered under Rule lOA of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. In reply the appellant asserted that it was the provision of Rule 10 G and not Rule 1 OA which was attracted to the facts and consequently the initiation of proceedings was barred by time. This plea did not find favour with the Excise Authorities, and the appellant was required to pay the additional duty ofRs.1.41 lakhs. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellant before the H 43 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 1 S.C.R. A High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and a Single Judge f acceptt:d the contention of the appellant that Rule 10 and not Rule lOA )._. of the Rules was applicable and on this view quashed the order dated 26th August, 1968. The respondents preferred an appeal to the Division Bench which B has reversed the order of the Single Judge, on the finding that it was a case falling under Rule 1 OA and dismissed the writ petition. In the appeal to this Court it was contended that the Single Judge >-- was right in taking the view that the case fell within the purview of Rule 10 of the Rules and that the Division Bench committed an error in c reversing the judgment, while the Revenue contested the appeal urging that on the facts found by the Division Bench, and indeed on the case set -- up by the appellant itself no exception could be taken to the finding of the Division Bench that it was Rule lOA and not Rule 10 which was attracted to the facts of the case. -,...- D Dismissing the Appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The question as to whether Rule 10 or Rule lOA was applicable has to be determined in the background of the procedure which was followed. The legal position is that Rule lOA does not apply where the case is covered by Rule lOofthe Rules. [48E] ,,A E N.B. Sanjana v. Elphinstone Mills, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 506, relied on. ... 2. Simply because Rule 9B of the Rules, was conceded not to have been taken recourse to by the respondent~ so that provisional assess- F ment could be said to have come into existence in its statutory sense as ~ contemplated by the said rule when duty was paid at the time of clea- ) ranee of the goods, the conclusion was not inescapable, that a f'.mal assessment had came into being at that time. [49A-B] 3. In view of the procedure adopted by the appellant it was appa- G rently a case where duty was calculated on the basis of price lists sup- plied by the appellant to facilitate the clearance of the goods and the correct amount of duty payable was yet to be determined after subse- " queยตt verification, and appellant was under an obligation to pay, on
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