LexSHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE, AMRITSAR versus MIHAN SINGH (DEAD) REP. BY BABA BANTA SINGH
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SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITIEE, A AMRITSAR v. MIHAN SINGH (DEAD) REP. BY BABA BANTA SINGH JULY 14, 1993 B [MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.) Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925: Section 16(2) (iii)-!nterpretation of-Religious institution-Declara- C tion as a Sikh Gurudwara-Conditions requisite for such declaration- 1-Vhether the institution in question a Sikh Gurudwara. On a petition Section 7(1) of the Sikh Gnrndwara Act, 1925, received from more than 50 Sikh worshippers of a Gnrndwara, praying for the Gnrudwara to be declared a Sikh Gurndwara, the petition and the list of D properties said to be belouglng to the Gurndwara were notified by the State Government and notices were sent to the persons ill possession o~ the properties. The respondent, who bad succeeded to the institution as the disciple of the builder of the institution, moved a petition before the State Govern- E ment under Section 8 of the Act, claiming that the said Gul'.!ldwara was not a Sikh Gurndwara, and that he was a hereditary office li!>!der of the institntion. The Sikh Gurndwara Tribunal to wbi<;b. the 1objection was referred declared, after conducting a civil trial, that the institution was a Sikh Gurndwara and dismissed the objection-petition. On reappreciation F of evidence, in appeal, the High Court allowed the objection and rejected the claim set up for declaring the institution to be a Sikh Gurndwara. In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant.SGPC it was contended that Section 16(2)(iii) bad neither been properly construed nor the evidence appreciated within the parameters or Section 16(2)(iii) of G the Act. Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1.1. Before a Gurndwara or an institution could be declared a Sikh Gurudwara, it must be established that it was founded at its H 141 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. A inception by the Sikhs for public worship. The mere fact that it was actually being used for public worship before and at the presentation of the petition under Section 7(1) is of no help singularly. Evidence as to the founding or establishing of the institution for public worship by the Sikhs is the sine quo non before the Tribunal or the Court, as the case may be, B can sustain the claim of the SGPC for declaring an institution to be a Sikh Gurudwara. (147-BCJ Gurmukh Singh v. Risa/dar Deva Singh & Ors., AIR (1937) Lahore 577; Atma Das v. Takhat Singh & Ors., AIR (1935) Lahore 809; Lachhman Das & Ors. v.Atma Singh & Ors., AIR (1935) Lahore 666; Hamam Dass v. C Rur Singh & Ors., (1935) 157 Indian Cases 142; Ram Piare v. Sardar Singh & Ors., AIR (1937) Lahore 786; Sundar Singh and Ors. v. Mahant Narain Das and Ors., AIR (1934) Lahore 920 and Mahant Budh Das and Ors., v. SGPC, AIR (1978) Punjab & Haryana 39, referred to. New Collins Concise Dictionary, (1983) Edn.; Webster's Comprehen- D sive Dictionary, International Edn., referred to. 1.2. The High Court had a correct perception of the requirement of Section 16(2)(iii) of the Act and was alive to the interpretation of the provision in the era before and after independence. Even otherwise, a peep E into the statement of the respondent in defence reveals that his immediate predecessor had founded the institution in question by purchasing land from his own pocket and had constructed the building some 55 years ago with some contribution of material made by two Sardars of a different village. This does not speak of the founding of the institution at its inception for use by Sikhs for public worship. Its subsequent use may have F some relevance to unearth the past but the past cannot be obviated to be unearthed when staking a claim. (147-F-H; 148-A) 1.3. In the face of the admission made before the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant Committee that direct evidence to prove that the institu- G lion established for public worship by the Sikhs was wanting and nothing further being available on this aspect in the statements of two witnesses exemined by it before the Tribunal, one being 30 years and the second being 32 years of age, and the institution having been established almost 25 to 30 years before their birth, the claim of the appellant Committee is not credible. It succeeded before the Tribunal only on drawing inferences from H the statements of the objector and his witness, overlooking that the onus GURUDWARA PRABA~DHAK COMMITTEE "· MIHAN SINGHf PU~CHHl.J.f 143 or proof
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