LexSHER SINGH & OTHERS versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB
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A B c D E ss2 SHER SINGH & OTHERS v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB March 24, 1983 (Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., V.D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.J Constitution of India-Art. 21-Fair procedure-Prisoner sentenced to death-Delay in execution of S(!ntence-Prisoner entitled to invJke jurisdiction under Art. 21 for exan1ining whether it is just and fair to allow sentence to be executed-Prisoner cannot den;and that sent"ence of (1eath should be quashed and substituted by sentence of life hnprisonnent-Prl lrnged delay is an important consideratiun but se1•eral ether factors n,'USt aho be Jaken into accou'nt-NO absJ/ute or unqualified rule can be laid down. The petitioners were convicted under s. 302 read with s. 34 l.P.C. -and were sentenced)o death on November 26, 1977. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence on July 18, 1978. The petitioners' Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the High Court was dismissed on March 5, 1979 and the Review Petition against the dismissal of tte Special Leave Petition was also dismissed on MarCh 2-r, 1981. The petitioners' successive writ: ·petitions challenging the validity of ss. 302 and 34 l.P.C. were dismissed on January 20, 1981 and August 24, 1981 respectively. The present writ petitions were filed on ~1arch 2, 1983 on the basis of the decision in .T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tan1il Na}u which was rendered on February 16, 1983. F The contention on beLlalf of the petitioners wa·. that more than two years had elapsed since they were sentenced to death· by the trial court and therefore they were entitled in terms of the ruling in Vatheeswa"an to demand that the said sentence should be quashed and substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. G HELD : Prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is unquestionably an important consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed. But no hard and fast rule that "dela)[exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentcne& of death" can be laid down ff as has been done in VaJheeswaran. [594 E-F] (i) No absolute or unqualified rule can be laid doWn that in evCry case in which there is a long delay in the execution of a death sentence,· the .. 1 SHER SINGH V, PUNJAB 583 sentence must ·be substituted by the sentence of life imprisonment. There are several other factors which must be taken into account while considering the queition as to whether the death sentence should be vacated. A convict is entitled to pursue all remedies lawfully open to· hiin and get rid of the sentence of death imposed upon him and his taking recourse t.o them to ask f0r the commutation of his sentence even after it is finally confirmed by this Court is understandable. But, it h, at least, relevant to consider whether the delay in the execution of the death sentence is attributable to the fact that he has resorted to a series of untenable proceedings which haye the ·effect of defeating the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a series of review petitions and writ petitions are filed in this Court to challenge judg- ments and orders which have assumed finality, without any seeming justifica- tion. Stay orders are obtained in those proceedings and then, at the end of i~ all, ·comes the argument that the,re has been prolonged delay ill imple- menting the judgment or order. The Court called upon to vacate a death sentence on the ground of delay caused in executing that sentence must find why tb:e delay was caused and wh_o is responsible for it. If this is not done, the law laid down by thh Court will become an object of ridicule by permitting a person to defeat it by resorting to frivolous proceedings in order to delay its implementation. Further, the nature of the offence, the diverse circumstances attendant upon it, its impact upon the contemporary society and the question whether the rrotivation and pattern of the crime .are such as are likely to lead to its repetition if the death sentenc" is vacated, are matters which must enter_ into the verdict as to whether the sentence should be \'acated for the reason that its execution is delayed. The substitution of the death sentence by a gent' nee of life imprisonment cannot follow by the application of the two years' formula as a matter of •·•quod erat
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