LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
โš–๏ธ Ask the AI about your situation:๐Ÿš— Car Accident๐Ÿ’ผ Work / Job๐Ÿ  Housing / Eviction๐Ÿ‘ช Family / Divorce๐Ÿ“‹ Contract Dispute๐Ÿ’ฐ Money Owed

SHEEL CHAND versus PRAKASH CHAND

Citation: [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 297 · Decided: 01-09-1998 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.S. ANAND, B.N. KIRPAL · Disposal: Case Allowed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

SHEEL CHAND 
v. 
PRAKASH CHAND 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1998 
[DR. A.S. ANAND AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.) 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : 
S.100--Second appeal-Scope of-Non-residential premises-
Landlord seeking eviction of tenant mz ground of bona fide need-ConcwTent 
finding of fact by t1ial cowt and appellate cowt that need of landlord was 
, not bona fide-High Cowt in second appeal, reversing the findin[jHeld, 
existence of a 'substantial question of law' is sine qua non for exercise of 
jwisdiction by High Cowt, which wzjustifiabj,)1 inte1fered with pure questions 
of fact-Rent and Eviction. 
Panclmgopal Banta v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, [1997] 4 SCC 713; 
K>hitish Chandra Purakait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Others, [1997] 5 
sec 438, relied on. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 14738 
of 1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.9.96 of the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court in S.A. No. 156 of 1994. 
M.L. Varma, Vivek Gambhir and D.P. Chaturvedi for the Appellant. 
S.S, Khanduja and B.K. Satija for the Respondent. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the 
High Court dated 13th September, 1996. 
Appellant is the tenant. Respondent is the landlord. The premises 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
had been let out by the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondentยท 
landlord in 1968. The suit for eviction was filed against the tenant by the 
respondent-landlord on various grounds including the ground that he 
required the suit premises for his bona fide personal need for starting his H 
297 
298 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 
A business. It was the case of the respondent - landlord that though he was 
an advocate, he wanted the suit shop for starting his business of a 'General 
Store' as he did not intend to practice law. The suit was resisted. The trial 
court after framing issues and recording evidence came to the conclusion 
that the need of the landlord was not genuine or bonafide. The suit was 
B dismissed. Landlord's appeal before the appellate authority failed and the 
finding recorded by the trial court of the effect that the need of the 
landlord was not bo11a fide or genuine was confirmed. The landlord there-
upon filed a second appeal in the High Court. By the impugned order the 
concurrent findings of fact were set aside by the learned Single Judge of 
the High Court in second appeal. 
c 
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 
The learned Single Judge while admitting the second appeal under 
Section 100 CPC framed the f@llowing question of law:-
D 
'Whether the finding relating to bo11afide requirement of the ap-
pellant of the Courts below is vitiated due to irrelevant considera-
tion and not under law?' 
In Panchugopal Barna v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, [1997] 4 SCC 713 
E to which one of us (Anand, J.) was a party, explaining the scope of Section 
100 CPC, it was observed :-
F 
G 
H 
"7. A bare look at Section 100 CPC shows that the jurisdiction 
of the High Court to entertain a second appeal after the 1976 
Amendment is confined only to such appeals as involve a substan-
tial question of law, specifically set out in the memorandum of 
appeal and formulated by the High Court. Of course, the proviso 
to the section shows that nothing shall be deemed to take away or 
abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, 
the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated 
by it, if the court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. 
The proviso presupposes that the court shall indicate in its order 
the substantial question of law which it proposes to decide even if 
such substantial question of law was not earlier formulated by it. 
The existence of a 'substantial question of law' is thus, the sine qua 
11011 for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended 
provisions of Section 100 CPC." 
SHEEL CHAND v. PRAKASH CHAND 
299 
The above judgment was approved by a three Judge Bench of this A 
Court in Kshitish Chandra Purakait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Others, 
[1997] 5 sec 438 wherein it was held :-
. 
"10 We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the 
High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved 
in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) 
cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its juris-
diction under the proviso to sub-Section(5) of Section 100 CPC in 
formulating the substantial question of

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.