SHARDA DEVI versus STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.

Citation: [2003] 1 S.C.R. 73 · Decided: 08-01-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.C. LAHOTI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

-, 
SHARDA DEVI 
A 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR. 
JANUARY 8, 2003 
[R.C. l..i\ttOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.] 
B 
Land Acquisition A•t. 1894-Sections 30, 3(2) and I I-Dispute as to 
pre-existing right or interest of State in the property sought to be acquired--
Reference to Civil Court by State-Maintainability of -Held, since State is C 
not a 'person interested' under Section 3(b) and such dispute cannot be 
adjudicated upon or referred to Civil Court, reference to the Court is wholly 
without jurisdiction and proceedings 11nder Section 30 are a nullity-However, 
State is not debarred from pursuing such other legal remedy before such other 
forum as may be available. 
Words and Phrases: 'Person interested'-Meaning of in the context of 
Section 3(b) of the land Acquis#ion Act, I 894. · 
Respondent-State acquired the land in question. Collector made an 
award and directed the amount of compensation as determined to be paid 
D 
to the appellant. Respondent filed an application before Collector seeking E 
a reference to civil court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894. It challenged the awud on the ground that the land did not belong 
to the person from whom it was purportedly acquired and was a land 
owned by the State having vested in it, consequent upon abolition of 
proprietary rights, much before acquisition. Civil Court rejected the 
reference. Respondent filed an appeal which was dismissed. It then filed F 
a Letters Patent Appeal. Division Bench framed the question whether 
reference under Section 30 of the Act was maintainable at the instance of 
the respondent and placed the matter before the Full Bench. Full Bench 
answered the question against the appellant and allowed the appeal. The 
matter was remanded to the Single Judge for deciding the case in the light G 
of the observations made by the Full Bench. Hence the present appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court. 
HELD: State is not a 'person interested' as defined in Section 3(b) 
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is not a party to the proceedings 
before the Collector in the sense, which the expression 'parties to the . H 
73 
74 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2003] I S.C.R. 
A litigation' carries. Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award 
as a representative of State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-
owned by State cannot be subject matter of acquisition by State. The 
question of deciding the ownership of State or holding of any interest by 
the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in 
B proceedings before the Collector as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act. If 
it was a Government land there was no question of initiating the 
proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the 
land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to pre-existing right or interest 
of State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute 
capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to Civil Court for 
C determination either under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The 
reference made by Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction 
and Civil Court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought 
to have rejected the same. All the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act 
beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the Civil Court 
suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and are, therefore, a nullity liable 
D to be declared so. However, the quashing of the proceedings under Section 
30 of the Act would not debar State from pursuing such other legal remedy 
before such other forum as may be available to the State Government and 
on the merits and the maintainability thereof. Further, the situation in law 
would have been entirely different if the title of the appellant would have 
E come to an end by any event happening or change taking place after the 
making of the award by the Collector. [89-H; 90-A-EJ 
F 
Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, (1965) 3 SCR 575 and Collector of 
Bombay v. Nusurwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors., AIR (1955) SC 298, relied 
on. 
Mohammad Wajeeh Mirza v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 
AIR [19211 Oudh 31, approved. 
Scindia Employees' Union v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1996) 10 
SCC ISO; State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and 
G Ors., (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 475; Secretary of State v. Sri Narain Khanna, AIR 
[1942) PC 35; Govt. of Bombay v. Esufali Salebhai 34 Dom 618; Deputy 
Collector, 

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