SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY versus KAUSHALYA SAWHNEY
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
SHAKUNTALA SAWHNEY
v.
KAUSHAL YA SAWHNEY
,4pril 4, 1979
[V. R. KRISHNA lYER AND V. D. TULZAPURKAR, JJ.]
639
Proc1?dt1re-Dury of Subordinate Court:1 in dealing with farnily dispute3.
The purpose of la\V and justice (Dharma) is promotion of cohesion and
no~ production of fission.
A judgment often possesses a sublime essence and a
humdrum component. The sublime· e1ement consists in the
optimi~tic endea·
vour to bring parties together so that the litigation may not cut them a-s
under, especiaJJy when they are blood relations like sisters. The -present appeal
in its happy conclusion, holds out the· higher lesson that hate and fight are
dis.solved by basic human fellnwsbip, even after bitter litigative struggle, if the
Bench and the Bair pursue consensual justice and bring into play conciliatory
processes and successfully persuade the parties to see reason and right beyond
bare law. If the effort succeeds, the court and counsel derive spiritual fulfilment
and get satisfactiori. The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously v.'hen parties,
despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or
union. !640 Dl
The present case is not merely a just adjustment of a bitter litigation but
._ J.
a path-finder for the subordinate courts in dealing with family or like disputes.
[643 Bl
A
B
c
D
The text and tlie context and the app]ication of traditional rules of statutory
E
inttrpretation, in a given case, might leave the position in an
un~,atisfactory
dilemma of dual import. Even an equitable approach n1ay not necessu-rily help
reach a just solution because equity shifts as the situation varies. Contradictory
positions taken by different High Courts add to the difficulty and result in the
deleterious uncertainty of the law. The Supreme Court may resolve the conflict
by exercising its preference guided by the language and the milieu and follo\ving
the customary canons of statutory interpretation. While its decision \vill be
F
binding on account of Art. 141 of the Constitution it may still be fallib1e
becanse the intendment of Parliament is best brought out by legislative clarifica-
tion in some cases. [640 H]
The appe1lant and the respondent were step-sisters-daughters of a common
father but of different mothers. The father who owned _vast propertie~ had
diea before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. The
G
respondent's mother who inherited her husband's estate died after the comiiig
into force of the 1956 Act. The High Court dismissed the appellant'~ claim
for a. half share in the propertie~ under~. 15(1)(a) of the Act. The ~pecific
point of claim, whether a son and daughter in the setting of s. 15(1)(a) of
the Act, includes stepMson and step-daughter or embraces only the son and
daughter of the deceased female propositus, has escaped
thei
Parliament's
attention while passing the legislation.
H
{A.t the Court's suggestion the parties came to a compromise assisted by
counsel on both sides.]
640
S"iJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1979] 3 s.c.R.
A
Tulzapurkar, J.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
Parliament should clarify its intention regarding s. B(l)(a) of the Act.
CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 348 of 1977.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
21-9-1976 oi the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 89/76.
W. C. Chopra for the appellant.
M. L. Varma for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-A judgment often possesses a
sublim~ essence
and a humdrum component. The appeal before us, in its happy con-
clusion, bolds out the higher lesson that bate and fight are dissolved
by basic human fellowship, even after bitter litigative struggle, if the
Bench and 1he Bar pursue consensual justice, and bring into play con-
ciliatory processes, and successfully persuade the parties to see reason
and right beyond bare law. If the effort succeeds, as it has in this
case, court and counsel derive spiritual fulfilment and get satisfaction.
Two sisters, apparently of the affluent bracket, with a common
father but different mothers, became estranged when one (the appel-
lant) claimed a half share in the estate of the father, on whose death
before 1956, the respondent's mother inherited her husband's estate
but died after 1956, possessed of her husband's assets and her own.
When intestate succession to her opened the plaintiff-appellant claimed
a half share therExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
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